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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that a court allows a social media site and its users 
to settle a suit about whether the site improperly tracked its users’ 
online behavior.1 As part of approving the settlement, the court 
requires the parties to publish notice in the print editions of The 
New York Times and The Wall Street Journal. Several months af-
ter the court approves the settlement, an individual user of the 
site, unaware of the settled class action, brings her own claim 
against the social media site. Unfortunately, this plaintiff reads 
only New York Times articles that her colleagues post on Facebook 
and Wall Street Journal articles that her friends retweet on Twitter, 
so she never saw the parties’ print ads. The court now must decide 
whether the parties complied with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
(FRCP) 23, which governs class action notice. If the court holds 
that publishing print ads in two nationwide newspapers satisfies 
FRCP 23 because “that’s the way it has always been done,”2 then 
the parties’ settlement binds this plaintiff. If, on the other hand, 
the court decides that FRCP 23 requires the parties to publish 
notice using new forms of technology—even if such notice reaches 
individuals outside the class—then the plaintiff can still pursue 
her claim.3 
 
 † BA 2009, The University of Chicago; MEd 2011, Arizona State University; JD Can-
didate 2017, The University of Chicago Law School. 
 1 This hypothetical draws on the facts of Lane v Facebook, Inc, 696 F3d 811, 816–18 
(9th Cir 2012), and the procedural posture of Hecht v United Collection Bureau, Inc, 691 
F3d 218, 220–21 (2d Cir 2012). 
 2 In re Scotts EZ Seed Litigation, 2015 WL 5502053, *2 (SDNY) (critiquing the de-
fendants’ argument that the court should require newspaper publication). 
 3 See Hecht, 691 F3d at 224–25 (finding that the plaintiff was not bound by the 
settlement because mere newspaper announcement did not meet due process require-
ments, and adopting the argument that “the defendant could have also undertaken a more 
extensive notification campaign—including electronic media”). 
 2164  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:2163 
   
Because an individual has a property interest in her right to 
bring a claim,4 the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prevent 
the government from disposing of her suit without due process.5 
But, because parties often cannot notify—or even identify—each 
member of a class, courts must weigh the trade-off between 
providing notice on the one hand and moving forward with litiga-
tion on the other.6 To that end, Mullane v Central Hanover Bank 
& Trust Co7 (which establishes the relationship between notice 
and due process8) and FRCP 23 allow courts and parties to con-
sider the facts and circumstances of the class action when crafting 
their notice plans. FRCP 23 requires parties to provide “the best 
notice that is practicable” to class members.9 This includes con-
tacting any individual “members who can be identified through 
reasonable effort.”10 Otherwise, parties may meet FRCP 23’s re-
quirement by publishing notice in a form that “is not substantially 
less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and cus-
tomary substitutes.”11 
Traditionally, parties complied with FRCP 23’s publication 
notice requirement by running newspaper advertisements.12 As 
new technologies allowed parties to publish notice using other 
“feasible and customary substitutes,”13 however, courts deter-
mined whether the rule required parties to do more to provide 
adequate publication notice.14 Most recently, courts have ad-
dressed whether FRCP 23 allows—or even requires—parties to 
 
 4 Phillips Petroleum Co v Shutts, 472 US 797, 807 (1985) (“[A] chose in action is a 
constitutionally recognized property interest.”). See also Martin H. Redish and Nathan D. 
Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 
95 Cal L Rev 1573, 1589–90 (2007) (“A legal claim has long been recognized as a form of 
property.”). 
 5 US Const Amend V; US Const Amend XIV, § 1. 
 6 See Hansberry v Lee, 311 US 32, 41–42 (1940) (noting that actual notice for all 
class members is impracticable and restricting due process violations to cases in which 
notice procedures do not “fairly insure[ ] the protection of the interests of absent parties”). 
 7 339 US 306 (1950). 
 8 See id at 314. 
 9 FRCP 23(c)(2)(B). 
 10 FRCP 23(c)(2)(B). 
 11 Mullane, 339 US at 315. 
 12 See id at 309–10 (describing the newspaper publication strategy utilized by the 
defendant in the case); Mirfasihi v Fleet Mortgage Corp, 356 F3d 781, 786 (7th Cir 2004) 
(“When individual notice is infeasible, notice by publication in a newspaper of national 
circulation . . . is an acceptable substitute.”). 
 13 Mullane, 339 US at 315. 
 14 See, for example, Baidoo v Blood–Dzraku, 5 NYS3d 709, 715 (NY Sup 2015) (ar-
guing that, in the context of service of process, publication notice “is almost guaranteed 
not to provide a defendant with notice of the action”); Mirfasihi, 356 F3d at 786 (“[I]n this 
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publish notice using the Internet and social media. Many notice 
plans now include a social media component,15 and most courts 
allow parties to provide publication notice using targeted social 
media banner ads.16 In contrast, courts only sometimes allow or 
compel parties to provide native or integrated social media no-
tice17 by, for example, posting information to their Facebook pages 
 
age of electronic communications, newspaper notice alone is not always an adequate al-
ternative to individual notice.”); In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 818 F2d 
145, 167–68 (2d Cir 1987) (discussing additional forms of substitute notice, including ad-
vertisements on radio and television). For examples of commentators arguing that, in light 
of new technologies, courts should reconsider whether newspaper publication satisfies 
FRCP 23’s “best notice that is practicable” standard, see Jennifer Lee Case, Note, Extra! 
Read All about It: Why Notice by Newspaper Publication Fails to Meet Mullane’s Desire-
to-Inform Standard and How Modern Technology Provides a Viable Alternative, 45 Ga L 
Rev 1095, 1118–24 (2011) (suggesting that due to population mobility, declining newspa-
per readership, and increasing internet usage, newspapers no longer provide constitution-
ally adequate methods of notice); Jordan S. Ginsberg, Comment, Class Action Notice: The 
Internet’s Time Has Come, 2003 U Chi Legal F 739, 753 (“Courts mistakenly assume . . . 
that print media publication is the most accessible, fair, and efficient means of appealing 
to a large group of geographically diverse individuals.”); Brian Walters, “Best Notice Prac-
ticable” in the Twenty-First Century, 7 UCLA J L & Tech *1, 7–16 (2003), archived at 
http://perma.cc/TJ4L-5AR4 (arguing that the Internet, not newspapers, provides the “best 
notice practicable”). 
 15 See Erin Coe, Social Media Class Notices Gain Traction but Carry Risks (Law360, 
Apr 24, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/JKZ6-DHGG (reporting an estimate that 15 per-
cent to 20 percent of current class action settlements include a “social media or digital 
notice component”). 
 16 Traditional banner advertisements typically appear in standard-sized rectangles 
located above the main body of a website. All users see the same banner advertisements. 
Targeted banner ads rely on “a vast infrastructure designed to track [users’] movements 
across the web to improve the effectiveness of ads.” Farhad Manjoo, Fall of the Banner Ad: 
The Monster That Swallowed the Web (NY Times, Nov 5, 2014), online at http:// 
nytimes.com/2014/11/06/technology/personaltech/banner-ads-the-monsters-that-swallowed 
-the-web.html (visited Oct 11, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 17 In contrast to banner ads, which are distinct from the website’s body and content, 
integrated or native social media advertisements appear “seamlessly” on social media web-
sites alongside stories about a user’s “friends, family and the things they care about.” How 
People See Ads (Facebook), archived at http://perma.cc/5KGK-SZHX. See also Native Ad-
vertising: A Guide for Businesses (FTC, Dec 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/CRU4 
-QURX (defining native advertising as “content that bears a similarity to the news, feature 
articles, product reviews, entertainment, and other material that surrounds it online,” and 
providing guidance for when businesses should disclose that integrated content is native 
advertising); Tony Hallett, What Is Native Advertising Anyway? (The Guardian), archived 
at http://perma.cc/GL2N-2P6N (“The difference between display ads online . . . and native 
ads is that the latter are in the flow of editorial content.”). 
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to cause fans or followers to receive updates18 or purchasing an ad 
integrated into a user’s Dashboard on Tumblr.19 
Taken together, these decisions raise questions about how 
courts do and should weigh the costs of over- and underinclusive 
FRCP 23 publication notice, creating uncertainty for litigants 
who propose novel notice plans and for courts faced with new 
technologies. For example, current case law fails to systematically 
explain why courts allow parties to publish notice on Facebook 
using targeted banner ads, but courts sometimes prevent parties 
from updating their Facebook pages to notify class members using 
native social media ads. Similarly, these decisions do little to help 
litigants predict why courts prohibit some parties from publishing 
notice using native social media ads, but allow other litigants to 
publish native social media notice by sending Facebook notifica-
tions to their fans. More generally, existing cases fail to explain 
how courts evaluate whether the new forms of publication notice 
satisfy FRCP 23. As courts evaluate more social media notice 
plans, litigants need to know when courts will allow parties to 
publish notice using new technologies and when they will not.20 
This Comment answers these questions—and in so doing, 
provides guidance to future litigants and courts trying to decide 
whether a new form of publication notice satisfies FRCP 23—by 
developing, testing, and applying a predictive model of when 
courts will and should decide that publication notice ensures due 
process.21 Part I explains FRCP 23’s notice requirements and in-
troduces both Mullane’s two-pronged notice test and the Mathews 
 
 18 See Marketing on Facebook Starts with a Page (Facebook), archived at 
http://perma.cc/J247-A7A4 (describing how businesses can promote content so that cus-
tomers see the information in their “News Feed—the constantly updating list of stories on 
Facebook”). 
 19 See Hello, Brands. (Tumblr), archived at http://perma.cc/WU5S-J3BF (describing 
how companies can create sponsored posts targeted to appear to specific demographics of 
users). For examples of how courts have decided cases involving native social media notice, 
see Part III.B.2. 
 20 See April 2015: Class Action Litigation Update (Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, 
LLP), archived at http://perma.cc/6TVJ-T3T9 (“As the number of social networking sites 
and users continues to grow, we expect courts to further develop additional innovations 
and parameters for the role of social media in Rule 23.”). 
 21 The methodology borrows from and loosely follows the use of in-sample and out-
of-sample data in predictive modeling. See generally Peter Reinhard Hansen and Allan 
Timmermann, Choice of Sample Split in Out-of-Sample Forecast Evaluation (Feb 7, 2012), 
archived at http://perma.cc/25HJ-K8PA. The Comment builds a model using cases that do 
not involve native social media ads, then tests the model using a different, out-of-sample 
set of native social media cases. 
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v Eldridge22 balancing equation. Part I also compares Mullane 
and Mathews and argues that even after the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Dusenbery v United States,23 courts can, must, and do 
balance the costs of over- and underinclusive notice. Part II ana-
lyzes past decisions to model how courts balance the costs of over- 
and underinclusion. Based on how courts already think about 
publication notice, Part II builds a predictive model and hypothe-
sizes that courts implicitly use that model to weigh the costs of 
over- and underinclusive publication notice. Part III first provides 
an overview of social media, differentiates between traditional 
banner advertisements and native social media ads, and uses ex-
isting cases involving social media publication notice to identify 
several puzzling results. To evaluate this Comment’s hypothesis, 
Part III then tests whether this Comment’s predictive model rec-
onciles or explains such cases. Because this Comment’s balancing 
equation successfully explains past decisions, Part IV uses the 
balancing equation to make predictions and normative claims 
about how courts will and should decide whether to approve fu-
ture publication notice plans. 
I.  NOTICE UNDER FRCP 23 
When the drafters of the 1966 amendments to the FRCP re-
wrote FRCP 23, they chose to create an opt-out class action de-
vice.24 Under this opt-out structure, a court’s decision binds class 
members and prevents them from litigating their claims on their 
own.25 In contrast to opt-out class actions under FRCP 23, opt-in 
actions, like those maintained under the Fair Labor Standards 
 
 22 424 US 319 (1976). 
 23 534 US 161 (2002). 
 24 See FRCP 23, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments. 
 25 See FRCP 23(c)(3)(A) (requiring that judgments in certain class actions “include 
and describe those whom the court finds to be class members”); FRCP 23(c)(2)(B)(vii) (in-
structing courts to inform class members in other class actions of the “binding effect of a 
class judgment”); LaChapelle v Owens–Illinois, Inc, 513 F2d 286, 288 (5th Cir 1975) (per 
curiam) (noting that in FRCP 23 class actions, judgment binds all members of the class). 
See also Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, 7AA Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 1789 at 553 (West 3d ed 2005) (“The obvious implication of Rule 23(c)(3) 
is that anyone properly listed in the judgment should be bound by it absent some special 
reason for not doing so.”); FRCP 23(c)(3), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amend-
ments (emphasizing that a judgment in a class action, “whether it is favorable or unfavor-
able to the class,” “embrace[s] . . . those to whom the notice prescribed by subdivision (c)(2) 
was directed, excepting those who requested exclusion or who are ultimately found by the 
court not to be members of the class”). 
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Act of 193826 (FLSA), bind only those plaintiffs who have affirma-
tively chosen to become part of the class.27 As a result, whereas 
notice in opt-in actions helps litigants and courts realize efficiency 
benefits by combining suits,28 notice in opt-out class actions pro-
tects class members’ due process rights.29 Because the drafters of 
the 1966 amendments to the FRCP recognized that a court must 
provide notice to class members to ensure due process,30 FRCP 23 
allows or requires courts to notify potential class members at sev-
eral crucial points during class action litigation.31 
In its current form, FRCP 23 allows courts to certify three 
types of classes depending on the nature of the claims the class 
members assert.32 FRCP 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) describe classes with 
members whose claims address the same legal question or who 
have suffered the same injury.33 Members of (b)(3) classes, how-
ever, have each suffered their own individual injury and often 
 
 26 52 Stat 1060, codified as amended at 29 USC § 201 et seq. 
 27 See 29 USC § 216(b) (“No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action 
unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party.”). See also Schmidt v Fuller 
Brush Co, 527 F2d 532, 536 (8th Cir 1975) (per curiam) (noting that actions under the 
FLSA bind only class members who opt in to the suit, notwithstanding the opt-out mech-
anism provided by FRCP 23). 
 28 See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc v Sperling, 493 US 165, 170 (1989) (noting that a “col-
lective action allows . . . plaintiffs the advantage of lower individual costs”). 
 29 See Hansberry v Lee, 311 US 32, 43 (1940) (holding that, in a class action or rep-
resentative suit, “members of the class who are present are, by generally recognized rules 
of law, entitled to stand in judgment for those who are not” only if the “procedure . . . 
satisf[ies] the requirements of due process”). See also In re Penthouse Executive Club Com-
pensation Litigation, 2014 WL 185628, *7 (SDNY) (“FLSA collective actions do not impli-
cate the same due process concerns as Rule 23 actions.”). 
 30 See FRCP 23(d)(2), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments (stating 
that the rule’s notice requirements are “designed to fulfill requirements of due process to 
which the class action procedure is of course subject”). See also Benjamin Kaplan, Contin-
uing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure (I), 81 Harv L Rev 356, 392 (1967) (arguing that FRCP 23’s notice requirements 
“join[ ] with other features of the new rule in helping to justify the ultimate extension of 
the judgment in (b)(3) cases to all members of the class, except those who requested exclu-
sion from the action”). 
 31 See FRCP 23(c)(2)(A) (allowing class certification notice to (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes); 
FRCP 23(c)(2)(B) (requiring class certification notice to (b)(3) classes); FRCP 23(d)(1)(B) 
(allowing notice to class members about developments in the case); FRCP 23(e)(1) (requir-
ing notice to class members who will be bound by a settlement, voluntary dismissal, or 
compromise); FRCP 23(h)(1) (requiring notice for an award of attorney’s fees). 
 32 FRCP 23(b). See also Amchem Products, Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591, 613–19 (1997) 
(describing the three types of class actions under FRCP 23(b)). For an explanation of how 
FRCP 23(b) operates and additional details about each of FRCP 23(b)’s three class action 
types, see Wright, Miller, and Kane, 7AA Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 1772, 1775, 
1777 (cited in note 25). 
 33 See FRCP 23(b)(1)–(2). 
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have strong incentives to litigate on their own.34 Nonetheless, 
FRCP 23(b)(3) allows a court to certify a (b)(3) class when it “finds 
that the questions of law or fact common to class members pre-
dominate . . . and that a class action is superior to other available 
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”35 
This Part explains differences between the relevant notice 
provisions in FRCP 23, describes how FRCP 23 operates in prac-
tice, and analyzes how the Supreme Court’s decisions about due 
process in general––and publication notice in particular––govern 
courts’ evaluations of publication notice under FRCP 23. This 
Part concludes by arguing that, even in light of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Dusenbery, courts can, must, and do evaluate publica-
tion notice by balancing the costs of over- and underinclusion. 
A. Class Certification Notice under FRCP 23(c) 
Whether and how the court must notify potential class mem-
bers depends on what type of class the court certifies.36 The more 
closely a typical class representative in that type of class would 
share the interests of the other class members, the less notice 
FRCP 23 requires.37 For example, members of (b)(1) and (b)(2) 
classes generally suffered the same injuries and seek the same 
relief.38 Moreover, unlike members of a (b)(3) class, (b)(1) and 
(b)(2) class members have no opportunity to opt out of the class 
 
 34 See FRCP 23(c)(2), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments. See also 
Kaplan, 81 Harv L Rev at 389–94 (cited in note 30) (describing individual incentives in a 
(b)(3) class). 
 35 FRCP 23(b)(3). 
 36 See FRCP 23(c)(2) (differentiating between notice for (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes on 
the one hand and notice for (b)(3) classes on the other). 
 37 See Battle v Liberty National Life Insurance Co, 770 F Supp 1499, 1515 (ND Ala 
1991) (explaining that the notice provisions in FRCP 23 “are premised on th[e] notion that 
the less the interests of individual members coincide with those of other members or the 
representatives, the greater will be the class notice demanded by due process”). See also 
Wright, Miller, and Kane, 7AA Federal Practice and Procedure § 1786 at 496 (cited in 
note 25) (noting that because actions brought under FRCP 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) will have 
“more cohesive” classes, “there is less reason to be concerned about each member of the 
class having an opportunity to be present”). 
 38 See FRCP 23(b)(3), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments (noting 
that classes certified under FRCP 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) more clearly call for class action); 
FRCP 23(c)(2), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments (distinguishing (b)(3) 
classes from (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes because members of (b)(3) classes have strong indi-
vidual interests); Kaplan, 81 Harv L Rev at 386–90 (cited in note 30) (implying that all 
(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes naturally call for class action). See also Wright, Miller, and Kane, 
7AA Federal Practice and Procedure § 1786 at 496 (cited in note 25) (describing (b)(1) and 
(b)(2) classes as “generally . . . more cohesive”). 
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and litigate on their own.39 Because (b)(1) and (b)(2) class mem-
bers share similar interests and have no opportunity to opt out, 
the FRCP and courts expect that the named class representatives 
likely protect the interests of the class as a whole.40 As a result, 
FRCP 23 allows the court to exercise discretion in deciding 
whether to provide notice to such class members because class 
representatives already protect their interests.41 
Whereas members of (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes share similar 
interests in a claim,42 members of (b)(3) classes often suffered 
more individualized injuries and so may have strong incentives to 
litigate on their own.43 In fact, potential (b)(3) class members 
might have such strong individual interests that the court de-
clines to certify the class.44 Even if the court agrees to certify the 
class, FRCP 23(b)(3) allows individual class members to opt out 
of the class and bring their own suits.45 To protect these individual 
interests and ensure individual class members have the oppor-
tunity to opt out, the drafters of the 1966 amendments rewrote 
FRCP 23 to require courts to direct notice to potential (b)(3) class 
members.46 According to the drafters, FRCP 23(c)(2)(B)’s notice 
provision “touches off the possibility” that a class member with 
injuries and claims for relief that differ from the rest of the class 
will pursue his claim on his own.47 In particular, FRCP 23(c)(2)(B) 
 
 39 See FRCP 23(e)(3), Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003 Amendments (“The op-
portunity to request exclusion from a proposed settlement is limited to members of a (b)(3) 
class.”). 
 40 See FRCP 23(c)(2), Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003 Amendments (explain-
ing that “[n]otice calculated to reach a significant number of class members often will pro-
tect the interests of all”). See also, for example, Larionoff v United States, 533 F2d 1167, 
1186 (DC Cir 1976) (noting that (b)(1) class members likely have “little interest . . . in 
controlling and directing their own separate litigation” and so (b)(1) classes are “likely to 
be more unified”); Wright, Miller, and Kane, 7AA Federal Practice and Procedure § 1786 
at 496 (cited in note 25) (“[I]t is reasonably certain that the named representatives [in 
(b)(1) or (b)(2) classes] will protect the absent members.”). 
 41 See FRCP 23(c)(2)(A) (noting that “the court may direct appropriate notice” to classes 
certified under FRCP 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2)) (emphasis added). See also Wright, Miller, and 
Kane, 7AA Federal Practice and Procedure § 1786 at 500 (cited in note 25) (discussing how 
FRCP 23(c)(2)(A) creates only a discretionary duty for courts to provide notice to (b)(1) and 
(b)(2) classes). 
 42 See Wright, Miller, and Kane, 7AA Federal Practice and Procedure § 1786 at 496 
(cited in note 25). 
 43 See FRCP 23(c)(2), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments. 
 44 See FRCP 23(c)(2), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments. See also 
FRCP 23(b)(3)(A) (instructing courts to consider “class members’ interests in individually 
controlling the [litigation]”). 
 45 See FRCP 23(c)(2), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments. 
 46 See FRCP 23(c)(2), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments. 
 47 Kaplan, 81 Harv L Rev at 392 (cited in note 30). 
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mandates that courts “direct to [(b)(3)] class members the best 
notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including in-
dividual notice to all members who can be identified through rea-
sonable effort.”48 
B. Settlement Notice under FRCP 23(e) 
In addition to mandating that a court notify class members 
when it certifies a (b)(3) class, FRCP 23 also requires the court to 
notify class members when the parties settle, compromise, or 
agree to dismiss their claims.49 In particular, FRCP 23(e)(1) cau-
tions that before accepting “a proposed settlement, voluntary dis-
missal, or compromise,” “[t]he court must direct notice in a rea-
sonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the 
proposal.”50 As a result, by forcing the parties to send notice again, 
FRCP 23(e) affords absent class members an additional oppor-
tunity to receive notice, weigh their options, and decide whether 
to opt out.51 
Although the drafters of FRCP 23 recognized the importance 
of guaranteeing class members a final chance to opt out,52 
FRCP 23(e)(1) demands less notice than does FRCP 23(c)(2)(B).53 
In practice, however, parties frequently seek certification and 
agree to settle in a single action.54 In such settlement class ac-
tions, courts require parties to provide notice to potential mem-
bers of the settlement class under the heightened notice require-
ments in FRCP 23(c)(2)(B).55 Nonetheless, because the parties in 
 
 48 FRCP 23(c)(2)(B). 
 49 FRCP 23(e)(1). 
 50 FRCP 23(e). 
 51 See FRCP 23(e)(3), Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003 Amendments (noting 
that once the parties have reached the stage of settlement, compromise, or dismissal, “[a] 
decision to remain in the class is likely to be more carefully considered and [ ] better informed”). 
 52 See FRCP 23(e)(3), Advisory Committee Notes to the 2003 Amendments. 
 53 Compare FRCP 23(e)(1) (“The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner.”), 
with FRCP 23(c)(2)(B) (“[T]he court must direct to [(b)(3)] class members the best notice 
that is practicable under the circumstances.”). See also Larson v Sprint Nextel Corp, 2009 
WL 1228443, *2–3 (D NJ) (differentiating the more stringent notice standard under 
FRCP 23(c)(2) from the more lenient notice contemplated by FRCP  23(e)(1)); Zimmer Pa-
per Products, Inc v Berger & Montague, PC, 758 F2d 86, 90 (3d Cir 1985) (noting that 
FRCP 23(c)(2) establishes a “higher notice standard” than FRCP 23(e)). 
 54 See Amchem, 521 US at 618 (noting that “the ‘settlement only’ class has become a 
stock device”). For an overview of such actions, see Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, 
and Mary Kay Kane, 7B Federal Practice and Procedure § 1797.2  (West 3d ed 2005). 
 55 See, for example, Larson v AT&T Mobility LLC, 687 F3d 109, 123–31 (3d Cir 2012) 
(analyzing settlement notice under FRCP 23(c)(2)(B)); In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust 
Litigation, 391 F3d 516, 536–37 (3d Cir 2004) (same); Larson, 2009 WL 1228443 at *2–3; 
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a settlement class action have, by definition, reached agreement, 
the parties rarely disagree about how to notify potential class 
members.56 Instead, objections to settlement notice usually come 
from absent class members who later argue that, because the par-
ties provided insufficient notice, they should not be prevented 
from litigating claims on their own.57 
C. FRCP 23, Publication Notice, and Due Process 
The Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Supreme Court agree that the Due Process Clauses in the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments govern class action suits.58 None-
theless, courts must trade off class members’ due process right to 
receive notice on the one hand and the prompt resolution of the 
class action suit on the other. So, in some circumstances, 
FRCP 23(c)(2)(B) only requires parties to provide publication no-
tice. In Mullane and Mathews, the Supreme Court developed two 
tests for courts to evaluate these types of due process trade-offs. 
This Section describes Mullane and Mathews, explains how Mullane 
established the due process standard courts use to evaluate class 
action publication notice, and introduces the Mathews balancing 
test. Although the Supreme Court distinguished Mullane and 
Mathews in Dusenbery, this Section follows the tradition of apply-
ing Mathews outside its administrative law origins59 to suggest 
that, when courts consider whether publication notice satisfies 
FRCP 23, Mathews and Mullane create the same balancing test. 
In particular, this Section argues that, because Dusenbery applies 
 
Grunewald v Kasperbauer, 235 FRD 599, 609 (ED Pa 2006); Thomas v NCO Financial 
Systems, Inc, 2002 WL 1773035, *7 (ED Pa). 
 56 See Judges’ Class Action Notice and Claims Process Checklist and Plain Language 
Guide: 2010 *2 (Federal Judicial Center), archived at http://perma.cc/PPM9-RPZP (cau-
tioning courts to be wary of notice plans submitted “in the diminished adversarial posture” 
of a settlement class action). 
 57 See, for example, Hecht v United Collection Bureau, Inc, 691 F3d 218, 221, 224–26 
(2d Cir 2012) (applying the notice standards for FRCP 23(c)(2)(B) to allow a member of a 
(b)(2) class to litigate individually because the parties failed to provide constitutionally 
adequate settlement notice). See also Kaplan, 81 Harv L Rev at 396 n 154 (cited in note 30) 
(describing the circumstances in which an absent class member can challenge the consti-
tutionality of notice after a court has approved settlement). 
 58 See FRCP 23(d)(2), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments (explain-
ing that the notice provisions in FRCP 23 are “designed to fulfill requirements of due pro-
cess to which the class action procedure is of course subject”); Hansberry, 311 US at 40 
(noting that it is the Court’s duty “to ascertain whether the litigant whose rights have thus 
been adjudicated has been afforded such notice and opportunity to be heard as are requi-
site to the due process which the Constitution prescribes”). 
 59 See text accompanying notes 87–92. 
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only when parties can identify and locate individual class mem-
bers, when class members cannot be located with reasonable ef-
fort, Mullane requires courts to balance the costs and benefits of 
different forms of publication notice. As a result, this Section con-
cludes that, even after Dusenbery, when parties cannot locate in-
dividual class members, they can, must, and do use a Mathews-
like balancing approach to evaluate publication notice under 
FRCP 23. 
1. Using Mullane and Mathews to evaluate due process. 
In Mullane, the Supreme Court developed a test to evaluate 
whether a plan to provide notice to parties absent from collective 
litigation satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process 
guarantee.60 Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company estab-
lished a common trust fund and sought to resolve a total of 113 
trusts by filing a petition for judicial settlement.61 Abiding by the 
procedures required by New York law, Central Hanover Bank no-
tified the members of the trust that it had applied to settle their 
accounts by publishing notice in a single local newspaper.62 Kenneth 
Mullane, the court-appointed guardian for members of the trust 
with interests in the income, brought suit, arguing that this no-
tice failed to satisfy due process.63 
To resolve Mullane’s suit, the Supreme Court articulated and 
applied two distinct standards for courts to use to evaluate 
whether notice satisfies due process.64 When a party knows the 
names and addresses of other absent, interested parties, it must 
provide individual notice in a manner “reasonably calculated to 
reach interested parties.”65 Because individuals read notices in a 
newspaper through “[c]hance alone,”66 the Court concluded that, 
if Central Hanover Bank knew the names and addresses of trust 
 
 60 Mullane, 339 US at 314–15. 
 61 Id at 309. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id at 310–11. 
 64 Mullane, 339 US at 315 (“[T]he constitutional validity of any chosen method may 
be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected 
. . . or, where conditions do not reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is not 
substantially less likely to bring home notice than other . . . substitutes.”). 
 65 Id at 318. 
 66 Id at 315. 
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holders, the Fourteenth Amendment required it to send them in-
dividual notice.67 In contrast, when a party cannot identify or lo-
cate interested parties, due process requires the party to publish 
notice in a “form . . . not substantially less likely to bring home 
notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes.”68 As 
a result, the Court concluded that, if Central Hanover Bank could 
not reasonably locate certain trust members, it could notify them 
by publication in a newspaper.69 
When the Advisory Committee amended FRCP 23 in 1966, 
it expected Mullane to govern the due process standard for class 
notice—and specifically cited Mullane in its advisory notes.70 Fol-
lowing the Advisory Committee’s lead, courts apply Mullane’s 
two-pronged test to determine whether a class action notice plan 
satisfies due process.71 When parties can identify the names and 
.addresses of class members “through reasonable effort,” courts 
interpret FRCP 23(c)(2)(B) to require the class representative to 
provide individual notice, no matter how great the cost.72 On the 
other hand, when parties cannot locate or identify potential class 
members, as long as parties provide the “best notice that is prac-
ticable under the circumstances,” courts approve publication no-
tice plans under FRCP 23 even if not all class members will be 
notified.73 Although the FRCP place the burden on the court to 
 
 67 Id at 318. 
 68 Mullane, 339 US at 315. 
 69 Id at 317. 
 70 See FRCP 23(d)(2), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments (explain-
ing that Rule 23 “fulfill[s the] requirements of due process” and citing Mullane, among 
other cases, as evidence and explanation of those requirements). See also Kaplan, 81 Harv 
L Rev at 396 (cited in note 30) (describing that Rule 23 recognizes that “[n]otice which is 
fair in the circumstances of the case is a constitutional requirement” and citing Mullane 
for the proposition that “perfect notice” becomes unnecessary when a sufficiently large and 
diverse set of the population receives notice). 
 71 See, for example, Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 US 156, 173–75 (1974) (citing 
FRCP 23 and Mullane and concluding that “[i]ndividual notice must be sent to all class 
members whose names and addresses may be ascertained through reasonable effort”). See 
also In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 818 F2d 145, 168 (2d Cir 1987) 
(discussing how Mullane impacts the court’s assessment of notice under Rule 23). 
 72 Eisen, 417 US at 173–77. 
 73 Mullins v Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F3d 654, 665 (7th Cir 2015) (noting that, 
“[w]hen class members’ names and addresses are [not] known or knowable, . . . alternative 
means” of notice are acceptable even if they will not provide “actual notice to all class 
members”). 
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provide notice,74 in practice, courts delegate to the parties the re-
sponsibility—and the cost, no matter how great75—of creating a 
notice plan and notifying potential class members.76 
While in Mullane the Court directly confronted a notice plan, 
in Mathews the Court resolved a line of cases addressing whether 
the procedural due process components of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments require the government to hold administrative 
hearings before taking property.77 The plaintiff argued that the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause required the Social Security 
Administration to hold a hearing before terminating his disability 
benefits.78 According to the Mathews Court, when deciding 
whether due process requires a pretermination hearing, courts 
must weigh three factors:79 First, courts must consider the party’s 
private interest in the property at stake.80 Second, courts must 
consider the risk that the existing procedure will result in an er-
ror and determine how much, if at all, the additional procedure 
will reduce the likelihood of error.81 Third, courts must consider 
the costs to the government of mandating and carrying out the 
additional procedure.82 Under this balancing test, once courts 
have measured each factor, they should require additional proce-
dure when the party’s private interest, multiplied by the in-
creased probability of accurate adjudication, exceeds the govern-
ment’s cost.83 In Connecticut v Doehr,84 the Court adopted the 
 
 74 FRCP 23(c)(2)(B) (“[T]he court must direct to class members the best notice prac-
ticable under the circumstances.”) (emphasis added). 
 75 See Eisen, 417 US at 176 (“There is nothing in Rule 23 to suggest that the notice 
requirements can be tailored to fit the pocketbooks of particular plaintiffs.”). 
 76 See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc v Sanders, 437 US 340, 354 & n 21 (1978) (“Although 
Rule 23(c)(2) states that ‘the court shall direct’ notice to class members, it commonly is 
agreed that the court should order one of the parties to perform the necessary tasks.”). 
 77  Mathews, 424 US at 332–35. 
 78 Id at 323–24. Although the Due Process Clause protects only liberty and property 
interests, the Court held that George Eldridge had a “‘property’ interest protected by the 
Fifth Amendment” in his Social Security disability benefits. Id at 332–33. 
 79 Id at 334–35. 
 80 Id at 335. 
 81 Mathews, 439 US at 335. 
 82 Id. 
 83 In mathematical terms, then, Mathews instructs courts to provide additional pro-
cedure when Private Interest * ∆p(Accuracy) > Cost. For a clear illustration of how courts 
calculate and then balance the Mathews factors, see Van Harken v City of Chicago, 103 
F3d 1346, 1351–52 (7th Cir 1997). See also Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 
§ 21.1 (Aspen 8th ed 2011) (describing “[t]he [e]conomic [g]oals of [p]rocedure,” including 
the Mathews balancing test, in terms of cost-benefit analysis); Andrew Blair-Stanek, 
Twombly Is the Logical Extension of the Mathews v. Eldridge Test to Discovery, 62 Fla L 
Rev 1, 15–17 (2010) (explaining how courts apply the Mathews balancing test). 
 84 501 US 1 (1991). 
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Mathews test for suits between individuals that raise procedural 
due process claims.85 In such suits, the Court held that when 
courts apply the Mathews test, they should consider the cost to 
the opposing party, rather than the cost to the government.86 
Although the Mathews test explicitly addresses only whether 
the Due Process Clause requires courts to provide pretermination 
hearings, courts apply Mathews more broadly in a variety of situ-
ations in which courts balance the costs and benefits of due pro-
cess. In fact, three years after it decided Mathews, the Supreme 
Court described the Mathews test as a “general approach for test-
ing challenged state procedures under a due process claim.”87 As 
a result, the Court has relied on the Mathews balancing frame-
work to evaluate, for example, the state’s burden of proof in pro-
ceedings to terminate parental rights88 and those to civilly commit 
a patient.89 Commentators have also read Mathews broadly, argu-
ing that Mathews explains the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell 
Atlantic Corp v Twombly90 and that courts should use the 
Mathews balancing framework to evaluate whether due process 
requires courts to offer class members opt-out rights91 and to de-
cide whether Internet service of process satisfies FRCP 4.92 
2. Comparing Mathews and Mullane in light of Dusenbery. 
In Dusenbery, the Court considered the relationship between 
Mathews and Mullane in the context of individual notice.93 After 
seizing Larry Dusenbery’s property during a drug raid and deter-
mining that it would not use the property as evidence, the FBI 
initiated forfeiture proceedings.94 Even though the FBI sent a cer-
tified letter to Dusenbery’s prison address, there was no record 
that Dusenbery ever actually received the letter informing him that 
 
 85 Id at 10–11. 
 86 See id at 11. 
 87 Parham v J.R., 442 US 584, 599–600 (1979). 
 88 See Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 758 (1982). 
 89 See Addington v Texas, 441 US 418, 425 (1979). 
 90 550 US 544 (2007). For an example of such commentary, see Blair-Stanek, 62 Fla 
L Rev at 17–32 (cited in note 83). 
 91 See Steven T.O. Cottreau, Note, The Due Process Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 
73 NYU L Rev 480, 513–28 (1998); Harvey Rochman, Note, Due Process: Accuracy or Op-
portunity?, 65 S Cal L Rev 2705, 2730–36 (1992). 
 92 See Rachel Cantor, Comment, Internet Service of Process: A Constitutionally Ade-
quate Alternative?, 66 U Chi L Rev 943, 949–50 (1999). FRCP 4 establishes the standards 
for service of process in federal courts. See FRCP 4. 
 93 See Dusenbery, 534 US at 166–68. 
 94 Id at 163–64. 
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the FBI planned to dispose of his property.95 Because Dusenbery 
contended that “the Mathews test is a distillation of the concerns 
identified in Mullane,”96 Dusenbery urged the Court to apply 
Mathews to balance his interest in his property against the gov-
ernment’s procedural burden.97 In particular, Dusenbery effec-
tively argued that the value of his interest in his property, multi-
plied by the reduction in “the likelihood of erroneous deprivation” 
caused by providing him with actual notice, exceeded how much 
the government would spend to ensure delivery of actual notice.98 
Refusing to engage in Mathews-style balancing, the Court re-
jected Dusenbery’s argument and adopted the Mullane approach 
instead.99 In particular, the Court portrayed Mathews and Mullane 
as requiring distinct inquiries involving different “analytical 
framework[s].”100 Mathews’s three-factor balancing test, for exam-
ple, would require the Court to consider whether the government 
could have done more to ensure that its letter reached Dusenbery.101 
In contrast, Mullane’s “more straightforward test of reasonable-
ness under the circumstances” would require the Court to ask 
only whether the notice was “reasonably calculated” to reach 
Dusenbery.102 As a result, emphasizing that it “s[aw] no reason to 
depart from [its] well-settled practice” of “turn[ing] to [Mullane] 
when confronted with questions regarding the adequacy of the 
method used to give notice,”103 the Court held that the FBI’s per-
sonal notice scheme satisfied Mullane’s “reasonably calculated” 
standard.104 
3. Even after Dusenbery, courts can, must, and do use a 
balancing test to evaluate publication notice. 
In Dusenbery, the Court distinguished Mathews and Mullane 
in the context of notice to individuals with a known address.105 As 
a result, some read Dusenbery as broadly rejecting the argument 
 
 95 Id at 164–67. 
 96 Reply Brief for Petitioner, Dusenbery v United States, No 00-6567, *5 (US filed Aug 
14, 2001) (available on Westlaw at 2001 WL 950934) (“Dusenbery Reply Brief”). 
 97 Dusenbery, 534 US at 167. 
 98 Dusenbery Reply Brief at *5–10 (cited in note 96). 
 99 See Dusenbery, 534 US at 167–68. 
 100 Id at 167. 
 101 See id, citing Mathews, 424 US at 335 (considering, as part of its second factor, the 
“probable value of additional safeguards”). 
 102 Dusenbery, 534 US at 167–68. 
 103 Id at 168. 
 104 Id at 172–73. 
 105 See id at 166–68. 
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that courts should use a Mathews-style balancing test to evaluate 
the sufficiency of notice under Mullane in any context.106 Because 
courts use Mullane to evaluate publication notice under 
FRCP 23,107 then, a broad reading of Dusenbery suggests that 
courts should not balance the costs and benefits of different forms 
of FRCP 23 publication notice. Continuing the “ever-expanding 
application”108 of Mathews’s “general multifactor analysis,”109 
however, this Section argues that courts implicitly use a 
Mathews-style equation to conduct the cost-benefit balancing 
mandated by Mullane and FRCP 23. Although Mathews and Mul-
lane use different language, both cases create the same cost-ben-
efit test for courts to evaluate whether parties provided the best 
notice practicable. Indeed, under either Mullane’s “not substan-
tially less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible 
and customary substitutes” test110 or Mathews’s three-part bal-
ancing equation,111 a notice plan is best when its marginal bene-
fits just equal its marginal costs. In fact, “Mullane, as applied by 
the [Supreme] Court [to evaluate notice], is notably similar to 
Mathews.”112 As a result, at least one court evaluating the consti-
tutional sufficiency of notice under Mullane has explicitly noted 
that its holding would be the same if it used Mathews instead.113 
 
 106 For examples of such broad readings, see W. Alexander Burnett, Casenote, Dusenbery 
v. United States: Setting the Standard for Adequate Notice, 37 U Richmond L Rev 613, 
625–26 (2003) (“In Dusenbery, the Court affirmed—in no unclear terms—that the Mullane 
standard is the appropriate analytical framework for determining whether a method of 
delivery of notice satisfies the due process requirements in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”); Snider International Corp v Town of Forest Heights, Maryland, 739 F3d 
140, 146 (4th Cir 2014), citing Dusenbery, 534 US at 168 (emphasizing that because 
“[n]otice and the hearing are two distinct features of due process, and are thus governed 
by different standards,” Mullane—rather than Mathews—“is the appropriate guidepost” 
for evaluating notice); Grayden v Rhodes, 345 F3d 1225, 1242 (11th Cir 2003) (noting that, 
under Dusenbery, when called on to evaluate a notice plan, the court “eschew[s] the bal-
ancing test in Mathews” in favor of Mullane); Salt Lake City Corp v Jordan River Restora-
tion Network, 299 P3d 990, 1034 (Utah 2012) (Lee dissenting) (“After Dusenbery, we are 
not at liberty to interject Mathews-based balancing into our evaluation of the notice re-
quired under the Due Process Clause.”). 
 107 See note 71 and accompanying text. 
 108 Blair-Stanek, 62 Fla L Rev at 4 (cited in note 83). 
 109 Cottreau, Note, 73 NYU L Rev at 512 (cited in note 91). 
 110 Mullane, 339 US at 315. 
 111 See text accompanying notes 79–82. 
 112 Jordan River Restoration Network, 299 P3d at 1007 n 9. 
 113 See James v City of Dallas, 2003 WL 22342799, *15 (ND Tex). 
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According to that court, “the choice of test d[id] not affect the out-
come of the analysis” in that case.114 Because a Mathews-style bal-
ancing test gives courts a form and structure to evaluate one pub-
lication notice plan relative to another, this Section argues that 
even after Dusenbery, courts can, must, and do balance the costs 
and benefits of publication notice. 
a) Because Dusenbery does not apply when the parties can-
not identify class members, courts can balance the costs and bene-
fits of publication notice.  Recall that Mullane established two dis-
tinct standards for courts to evaluate notice plans depending 
on whether the parties can identify class members.115 Despite 
Dusenbery’s broad language, however, the Dusenbery Court ex-
plicitly addressed only one of Mullane’s notice standards: how 
Mullane and Mathews relate in the context of providing notice to 
an individual with a known address.116 In fact, the Dusenbery 
Court answered a narrow question: the Court granted certiorari 
to resolve a split in the circuits over whether the Fifth Amendment 
requires the government to provide actual notice to inmates with 
known addresses when it intends to forfeit their property.117 By 
declining to engage in Mathews-style balancing, the Dusenbery 
Court implicitly emphasized the absolute nature of Mullane’s 
“reasonably calculated” test for notice to individuals whom the 
parties can reasonably locate.118 Dusenbery said nothing, however, 
about whether courts can engage in Mathews-style balancing 
when the whereabouts of the parties are unknown. As a result, 
even following Dusenbery, when the parties cannot identify class 
members “through reasonable effort,”119 courts can balance costs 
and benefits to ensure that the parties provide notice in a form 
that “is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than 
other of the feasible and customary substitutes.”120 
b) Under Mullane, courts must balance the costs and bene-
fits of FRCP 23 publication notice.  Consider a court evaluating a 
class action notice plan under FRCP 23 after Dusenbery. First, 
 
 114 Id. 
 115 See notes 64–73 and accompanying text. 
 116 See Dusenbery, 534 US at 168–69. 
 117 See id at 166–67. 
 118 Id at 171–73 (rejecting Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissenting argument that 
the Court should evaluate the FBI’s individual notice plan relative to the Bureau of 
Prison’s current procedure). 
 119 FRCP 23(c)(2)(B). 
 120 Mullane, 339 US at 315. 
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the court asks whether the parties can identify and locate indi-
vidual class members. If they can, then FRCP 23 requires the par-
ties to provide individual notice and Dusenbery prevents the court 
from balancing one notice plan against another. If the parties can-
not locate class members “through reasonable effort,” however, 
then FRCP 23 instructs the court to provide “the best notice that 
is practicable under the circumstances”;121 Dusenbery no longer 
controls. 
At this second step, Mullane and FRCP 23 dictate that the 
court balance the costs and benefits of different publication notice 
plans. The Supreme Court’s language in Mullane requires lower 
courts to evaluate whether publication notice satisfies due pro-
cess relative to other possibilities. For example, by instructing 
courts to approve publication notice “not substantially less likely” 
to reach unknown parties, Mullane mandates that courts weigh 
possible alternative notice plans.122 Likewise, by requiring courts 
to consider other “customary substitutes,” Mullane forces courts 
to evaluate whether publication notice satisfies due process in 
light of the technology of the day.123 Finally, Mullane requires 
courts to weigh the costs and benefits of alternative notice plans 
by directing them to consider only “feasible . . . substitutes.”124 
When the Advisory Committee amended FRCP 23 in 1966, it 
intentionally incorporated Mullane’s mandate that courts weigh 
the costs and benefits of publication notice relative to other pos-
sible notice plans.125 Consider the language of FRCP 23: 
FRCP 23(c)(2) instructs courts to provide “the best notice that is 
practicable under the circumstances,”126 not just notice that ex-
ceeds a “reasonably calculated” threshold.127 By using the super-
lative “best,” FRCP 23(c)(2)(B) requires courts to weigh alterna-
tive notice plans and approve the proposal most likely to inform 
class members about their rights. The qualifying “practicable un-
der the circumstances” language, however, reminds courts to bal-
ance the costs and benefits of any notice plan.128 
c) Courts use a Mathews-style balancing test to evaluate 
FRCP 23 publication notice.  Regardless of the actual reach of 
 
 121 FRCP 23(c)(2)(B). 
 122 Mullane, 339 US at 315. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 See note 70 and accompanying text. 
 126 FRCP 23(c)(2)(B). 
 127 Mullane, 339 US at 314. 
 128 See Ginsberg, Comment, 2003 U Chi Legal F at 745–47 (cited in note 14). 
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Dusenbery’s holding, as a descriptive matter, courts continue to 
implicitly129—and sometimes explicitly130—use a Mathews-like 
balancing framework to evaluate publication notice. To see why, 
suppose that courts read Dusenbery to apply when parties could 
not locate individual class members and asked only whether the 
parties proposed a publication notice scheme that was “reasonably 
calculated” to inform class members. Such courts would evaluate 
the parties’ publication notice plans in the absolute, without con-
sidering alternative proposals. Once a notice plan exceeded Mul-
lane’s “reasonably calculated” threshold, the courts would not 
consider what else the parties could have done.131 Instead, when 
courts determine whether class action publication notice satisfies 
due process, they measure parties’ proposals against alternatives; 
when the parties’ proposals come up short, the courts “push the 
parties to do better.”132 
To illustrate how courts apply Mullane and Mathews to eval-
uate FRCP 23 notice after Dusenbery, consider, for example, 
Shurland v Bacci Café & Pizzeria on Ogden, Inc.133 In Shurland, 
the plaintiff brought a class action suit against a local pizzeria for 
violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act by printing full credit card 
numbers and expiration dates on its customers’ receipts.134 The 
plaintiff asked the court to approve a notice plan consisting of a 
single advertisement in The Chicago Sun-Times and additional 
publication notice on the class counsel’s website.135 The court eval-
uated the plaintiff’s notice proposal using Mullane’s two distinct 
standards. First, because the court determined that the parties 
could not identify the names and addresses of individual class 
 
 129 See text accompanying notes 133–43. For other examples of courts implicitly ap-
plying Mullane and Mathews in the way described, see Mirfasihi v Fleet Mortgage Corp, 
356 F3d 781, 786 (7th Cir 2004) (acknowledging that “notice by publication in a newspaper 
of national circulation” satisfies Mullane, but emphasizing that changing technologies 
might require the parties to do more); In re Scotts EZ Seed Litigation, 2015 WL 5502053, 
*1–2 (SDNY) (approving the plaintiff’s plan to publish notice using only targeted Internet 
banner advertisements because the defendant failed to convince the court that the plaintiff 
would reach more class members by also publishing notice in a newspaper). 
 130 See text accompanying note 157. 
 131 See text accompanying notes 101–04. 
 132 Kaufman v American Express Travel Related Services, Inc, 283 FRD 404, 407–08 
(ND Ill 2012) (declining to approve the parties’ notice plan without consulting an inde-
pendent notice expert because other cases “requiring or approving more extensive notice 
plans . . . exemplif[ied] the type of effort the court expects”). 
 133 271 FRD 139 (ND Ill 2010). 
 134 Id at 141. 
 135 Id at 147. 
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members,136 it cited Mullane to emphasize that FRCP 23 did not 
require the parties to provide individual notice.137 The court then 
moved to Mullane’s second prong and considered whether the par-
ties provided the best practicable notice.138 The court acknowl-
edged that, according to precedent, running a single newspaper 
advertisement would comply with Mullane.139 Under a broad 
reading of Dusenbery, the court’s analysis would end there: once 
the court determined that a single advertisement in a newspaper 
satisfies Mullane, the court would not consider whether the plain-
tiff could provide better notice. 
Yet in Shurland, the court proceeded to balance the costs and 
benefits of “a variety of other means and methods” for publishing 
notice.140 Although the court did not cite Mathews, it implicitly 
used a Mathews-style framework to balance these other notice 
plans.141 For example, the court discussed the class’s relatively 
small size and geographic concentration, hinting that the mar-
ginal benefits of additional localized notice outweighed its costs.142 
As a result, the court suggested that the plaintiff, in addition to 
publishing notice in a citywide newspaper, advertise in neighbor-
hood publications and in the restaurant itself.143 Because the 
court declined to end its analysis at publication notice that ex-
ceeded Mullane’s “reasonably calculated” threshold, it directed 
the plaintiff to propose a new notice plan that would provide the 
best notice practicable given the size of the class and the nature 
of the claim.144 
Moreover, just four years after it decided Dusenbery, the 
Supreme Court again considered, in Jones v Flowers,145 whether 
a state’s procedure for providing notice before it seized property 
satisfied the Due Process Clause.146 Although the Court emphasized 
 
 136 Id at 142. 
 137 See Shurland, 271 FRD at 144–45. 
 138 See id at 147. 
 139 See id, citing Mirfasihi, 356 F3d at 786. 
 140 Shurland, 271 FRD at 147. 
 141 See id (suggesting that providing notice through “local publications,” “posting the 
class notice at Bacci, and posting a link to the class notice on Bacci’s website” would be 
cost-effective means of ensuring widespread notice). For additional analysis of how courts 
use Mathews to balance the costs and benefits of FRCP 23(c)(2) publication notice, see 
Part II. 
 142 See Shurland, 271 FRD at 147. 
 143 Id at 147–48 (requiring the plaintiff to “propose a new plan for notifying the class” 
based on the court’s suggestions). 
 144 See id at 148. 
 145 547 US 220 (2006). 
 146 See id at 223. 
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that it had “no intention to depart” from the basic constitutional 
principles embodied in Mullane and Dusenbery,147 it assessed the 
adequacy of the state’s notice by “balancing the interest of the 
State against the individual interest sought to be protected.”148 
According to the Court’s balancing, the Due Process Clause re-
quires a state to “take additional reasonable steps” after it mails 
notice of a tax sale and the notice is returned unclaimed.149 In con-
trast, the Court concluded that the Due Process Clause does not 
force the state to search its records for new addresses because do-
ing so “imposes burdens . . . significantly greater than [other] rel-
atively easy options.”150 By balancing the individual’s interest 
against the government’s and by considering the costs of one no-
tice plan relative to others, the Jones Court employed a Mathews-
style test, even if it did not do so in name. 
Whereas the courts in Shurland and Jones implicitly turned 
to Mathews to balance costs and benefits, other courts more ex-
plicitly rely on Mathews in considering whether the parties have 
provided the best practicable notice. In Salt Lake City Corp v Jordan 
River Restoration Network,151 for example, the Supreme Court of 
Utah considered whether Salt Lake City satisfied due process re-
quirements when it published notice about bond validation proce-
dures in several specialized newspapers and websites.152 The case 
arose outside the class action context, but the court evaluated the 
city’s notice under the same Mullane test courts use to evaluate 
class action notice under FRCP 23.153 Although the court cited 
Dusenbery, which would presumably foreclose it from engaging in 
Mathews-style balancing, it evaluated whether the city’s notice 
plan satisfied due process by “balancing the individuals’ interest, 
the government’s interest, and the likely benefit of additional or 
substitute notice.”154 Applying this Mathews-style balancing test, 
the court concluded that the city’s notice plan satisfied the Due 
Process Clause.155 Even more strikingly, in Mullins v Direct Digital, 
LLC,156 the Seventh Circuit explicitly cited Mathews in the class 
 
 147 Id at 238. 
 148 Id at 229 (quotation marks omitted). 
 149 See Jones, 547 US at 225. 
 150 Id at 236. 
 151 299 P3d 990 (Utah 2012). 
 152 Id at 996–97. 
 153 Id at 1006. 
 154 Id at 1016. 
 155 See Jordan River Restoration Network, 299 P3d at 1015–19. 
 156 795 F3d 654 (7th Cir 2015). 
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action notice context to argue that the type of publication notice 
should correspond to the stakes of the litigation.157 
* * * 
Although “[n]otice is crucial to the entire scheme of 
Rule 23(b)(3),”158 this Part demonstrated that FRCP 23 does not 
require parties to provide actual notice to each class member. In-
stead, when the parties cannot identify members of the class, 
FRCP 23 allows courts to provide publication notice. Yet not just 
any form of publication notice will do. To comply with FRCP 23, 
courts must provide “the best notice that is practicable under the 
circumstances.”159 To figure out which notice is best, courts must bal-
ance one notice plan against another. To the extent that Dusenbery 
forecloses courts from using Mathews to balance, it does so in 
name only. Because Mathews and Mullane establish the same 
test to evaluate FRCP 23 publication notice, courts continue to 
rely on Mathews. 
II.  A BALANCING TEST FOR PUBLICATION NOTICE 
The previous Part argued that, because FRCP 23 and Mullane 
require parties to provide “the best notice that is practicable”160 in 
a “form . . . not substantially less likely to bring home notice than 
other of the feasible and customary substitutes,”161 courts can, 
must, and do use a Mathews-style balancing test to weigh the 
costs and benefits of publication notice plans. But that only par-
tially explains how courts decide whether to approve a notice 
plan. If litigants and courts want to predict whether and in what 
cases future courts will decide to approve new forms of publication 
notice, they need to know how courts weigh costs and benefits to 
identify the best practicable notice. 
This Part analyzes publication notice decisions to develop a 
model that explains how courts balance the costs and benefits of 
alternative publication notice plans. Part II.A describes the costs 
of over- and underinclusion and explains how courts use details 
about the class, the defendant, the claims, and the next best no-
tice plan to compare one notice plan to another. Part II.B uses the 
 
 157 See id at 665. 
 158 Wright, Miller, and Kane, 7AA Federal Practice and Procedure § 1786 at 492 (cited 
in note 25). 
 159 FRCP 23(c)(2)(B). 
 160 FRCP 23(c)(2)(B). 
 161 Mullane, 339 US at 315. 
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variables identified in Part II.A, which courts already consider to 
compare notice plans, to build a model that predicts when courts 
will approve alternative forms of publication notice. 
A. Balancing Over- and Underinclusion 
Ideally, publication notice would reach all the individuals in 
a class and none of the individuals outside it. Unless the parties 
can perfectly identify and target class members, however, the par-
ties must publish notice to more non–class members to reach 
more class members. To determine whether a proposed publica-
tion notice plan provides the best notice practicable, courts weigh 
the benefits of reaching more class members against the costs of 
notifying individuals outside the class.162 In doing so, courts seek 
to ensure that a publication notice plan strikes the right balance 
between over- and underinclusion. This Section discusses how 
courts measure the benefits of reaching more class members and 
the costs of reaching more individuals outside the class. 
1. Measuring the benefits of reaching more class members. 
The drafters of the 1966 FRCP amendments recognized that 
a class action’s constitutional legitimacy turns on providing notice 
to class members because notice “touches off the possibility” that 
a class member will opt out.163 Publication notice that fails to 
reach potential class members leaves them in the dark and robs 
them of this opportunity.164 In contrast, when class members do 
receive notice, they can make informed decisions about whether 
to continue litigating as a member of the class.165 
Because of these clear due process benefits, courts focus on 
ensuring that publication notice reaches a sufficient portion of the 
class.166 For example, the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), the con-
gressionally established “education and research agency for the 
federal courts,”167 urges judges to consider whether publication 
 
 162 See, for example, Tylka v Gerber Products Co, 182 FRD 573, 578 (ND Ill 1998). 
 163 Kaplan, 81 Harv L Rev at 392 (cited in note 30). 
 164 See Barbara J. Rothstein and Thomas E. Willging, Managing Class Action Litiga-
tion: A Pocket Guide for Judges *26 (Federal Judicial Center, 3d ed 2010), archived at 
http://perma.cc/5QKD-REH4 (“Opt-out notice binds class members by their silence, so you 
will want to focus on ensuring adequate notice.”). 
 165 See text accompanying notes 43–47. 
 166 In advising judges on how to evaluate notice plans, the Federal Judicial Center 
suggests that they first determine whether notice “[w]ill [ ] effectively reach the class.” 
Claims Process Checklist at *1 (cited in note 56). 
 167 Home (Federal Judicial Center, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/B9ZR-ZDKE. 
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notice covers a “broad” geographical area and to closely scrutinize 
the publication notice plan’s “reach.”168 In particular, the FJC cau-
tions that courts should approve notice plans only after evaluat-
ing how many potential class members will be exposed to publi-
cation notice, and that reasonable notice plans often reach 70 
percent to 95 percent of the class.169 When courts determine that 
a notice plan fails to reach enough class members, they reject the 
plan for being underinclusive.170 
When parties want to reach more class members, they choose 
between alternative publication notice plans. To determine 
whether one form of publication notice is likely to generate more 
benefits than another, courts consider which of these alternate 
forms of publication notice is more likely to reach class members. 
To make this comparison, courts look to the demographics of the 
class and its baseline level of awareness about the class action. 
The FJC, for example, instructs judges that “[t]he notice plan 
should include an analysis of the makeup of the class,” including 
its educational background, gender ratio, and socioeconomic sta-
tus, before it is approved.171 Following the FJC’s recommendation, 
courts consider, for example, where class members live,172 what 
types of publications they read,173 and the nature of the claim174 
before deciding whether to approve a notice plan. In addition, 
courts consider whether the media extensively covered the class 
action suit to determine whether and how much publication no-
tice the class must provide.175 
 
 168 Claims Process Checklist at *1–3 (cited in note 56). 
 169 Id at *3. 
 170 See, for example, Hecht v United Collection Bureau, Inc, 691 F3d 218, 225 (2d Cir 
2012) (holding that a settlement class failed to satisfy FRCP 23 by publishing notice in a 
single issue of USA Today). 
 171 Claims Process Checklist at *2 (cited in note 56). 
 172 See, for example, Shurland, 271 FRD at 147 (recommending that, because most of 
the class lived in Berwyn, Illinois, the parties publish notice in local publications in addi-
tion to publishing notice in The Chicago Sun-Times); Jermyn v Best Buy Stores, LP, 2010 
WL 5187746, *5 (SDNY) (requiring the plaintiff to publish notice in newspapers with a 
readership outside New York City because the class encompassed the entire state). 
 173 See, for example, In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litigation, 391 F3d 516, 526 
(3d Cir 2004) (approving a plan to publish notice in USA Today, USA Weekend, Parade 
Magazine, Modern Maturity, and Reader’s Digest because the class members “are gener-
ally over the age of 50”). 
 174 See, for example, Evans v Linden Research, Inc, 2013 WL 5781284, *1, 3 (ND Cal) 
(finding it appropriate to provide notice by e-mail and through various websites for a class 
action involving an Internet role-playing game). 
 175 See, for example, The Authors Guild v Google Inc, 770 F Supp 2d 666, 676 (SDNY 
2011) (finding notice adequate in part because “the case has received enormous publicity, 
and it is hard to imagine that many class members were unaware of the lawsuit”); Santos 
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Nonetheless, the benefits of providing notice are not the same 
in each case.176 The more at stake in the litigation—or the more 
any individual’s claim differs from the class’s—the greater the 
benefits of reaching more class members. In Hughes v Kore of 
Indiana Enterprise, Inc,177 for example, the Seventh Circuit con-
sidered the class members’ financial interest in a class action lit-
igation in determining whether to approve a notice plan.178 A class 
of plaintiffs who had withdrawn money from the defendant’s 
ATMs in Indianapolis brought suit because the defendant failed 
to post notices on its machines that they charged a withdrawal 
fee.179 Making certain assumptions about the number of class 
members and the number of ATM transactions per class member, 
the court estimated that each class member stood to gain a max-
imum of $3.57 per transaction if the class action succeeded, and a 
likely award of $100 if he opted out and successfully litigated on 
his own.180 The court acknowledged that the proposed publication 
notice plan—stickers on the ATMs, an ad in the leading Indianapolis 
newspaper, and a class website—might never reach all of the 
class members.181 Given each class member’s small stake and the 
small difference between litigating as a member of the class and 
bringing suit alone, however, the court held that the publication 
notice plan was “adequate [under] the circumstances.”182 
 
v Camacho, 2008 WL 8602098, *14 (D Guam) (taking judicial notice of the extensive press 
coverage of the class action in determining whether to reduce the standards for publication 
notice); Nilsen v York County, 382 F Supp 2d 206, 211–12 (D Me 2005) (approving a notice 
plan because class members not reached by publication notice might have become aware 
of the suit through the media or the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ live press conference). 
 176 See Battle v Liberty National Life Insurance Co, 770 F Supp 1499, 1515 (ND Ala 
1991) (“[T]he less the interests of individual members coincide with those of other mem-
bers or the representatives, the greater will be the class notice demanded by due process.”). 
 177 731 F3d 672 (7th Cir 2013). 
 178 Id at 677. 
 179 Id at 674. 
 180 Id at 674–75. 
 181 Hughes, 731 F3d at 677. 
 182 Id. 
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2. Measuring the costs of reaching more non–class 
members. 
Although the FJC183 and notice consulting firms184 caution 
courts to closely analyze whether a notice plan reaches enough 
potential class members, neither the FJC nor notice consultants 
worry much about reaching too many individuals outside the 
class. Nonetheless, overinclusive publication notice imposes sev-
eral subtle but important costs on the courts, the parties, and the 
public. First, additional overinclusive notice forces the parties to 
spend money and time printing more notice forms, mailing notice 
more broadly, or purchasing additional advertisements.185 Sec-
ond, courts worry that overbroad notice confuses non–class mem-
bers, forcing them to incur costs to determine whether they belong 
to a potential class.186 Similarly, the more frequently individuals 
outside a class receive notice, the more time courts and parties 
spend sorting out claims and questions from non–class mem-
bers.187 Third, overbroad notice likely results in a “boy who cried 
wolf” dilemma: the more often individuals receive notice about 
classes they do not belong to, the less likely they may be to re-
spond to notice that actually concerns them.188 Finally, courts 
 
 183 See, for example, Rothstein and Willging, A Pocket Guide for Judges at *27 (cited 
in note 164) (noting that a judge’s “primary goals are that the notice reach as many class 
members as possible, preferably by individual notification,” and that the class members 
understand and act on the notice). 
 184 Notice consulting firms like Kinsella Media promise to help parties achieve “across 
the board reach.” Notice Program Design and Implementation (Kinsella Media), archived 
at http://perma.cc/72KH-SESZ (emphasis omitted). Parties hire consultants “to dissemi-
nate and administer the proposed notice plan.” Flynn v Sony Electronics, Inc, 2015 WL 
128039, *1 (SD Cal) (reporting that the plaintiffs hired Kurtzman Carson Consultants). 
The FJC recommends that a judge require the class to submit a notice plan “from a qual-
ified professional” or rely on the judge’s own expert report. See Claims Process Checklist 
at *1–2 (cited in note 56). For an example of a judge declining to approve a notice plan 
without consulting her own independent notice expert, see Kaufman v American Express 
Travel Related Services, Inc, 283 FRD 404, 408 (ND Ill 2012). 
 185 See, for example, Martin v Weiner, 2007 WL 4232791, *3, 5 (WDNY) (imposing on 
the defendant the direct costs of updating its website to notify potential class members of 
pending litigation). 
 186 See In re Domestic Air Transportation Antitrust Litigation, 141 FRD 534, 546 (ND 
Ga 1992) (worrying that overbroad notice “would most likely confuse the recipients and 
encourage claims by non-class members”); Macarz v Transworld Systems, Inc, 201 FRD 
54, 64 (D Conn 2001). 
 187 See Flynn, 2015 WL 128039 at *3 (“[I]t is clear that mailing a notice of a class 
action directly to a non-class member would likely lead to inquiries by non-class members.”). 
 188 Richard H. Thaler, Cass R. Sunstein, and John P. Balz, Choice Architecture *9, 
archived at http://perma.cc/2434-9F7X. 
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worry that overbroad notice causes undue or excessive reputa-
tional harms to the defendant.189 In Tylka v Gerber Products Co,190 
for example, the court rejected the plaintiff’s plan to publish no-
tice of a class action suit involving Illinois class members in na-
tionwide newspapers.191 According to the court, such overbroad 
notice appeared to be designed to “club [the defendant] into sub-
mission,” not to actually notify potential class members of the 
plaintiff’s claim.192 As a result of the potential costs of providing 
overinclusive notice, courts refuse to approve notice plans that 
reach too many people outside the class.193 
B. Building a Predictive Model 
The previous Section showed that, to balance the trade-offs 
between over- and underinclusion, courts evaluate details about 
the class, the defendant, the claim, and the next best notice plan. 
This Section formalizes the variables identified in Part II.A, 
which courts already consider,194 and adapts the Mathews balanc-
ing equation to describe when courts will decide that a publication 
notice plan satisfies FRCP 23’s “best notice that is practicable” 
and Mullane’s “not substantially less likely” standards. In turn, 
Part III.C uses a new set of publication notice decisions about so-
cial media cases to test how accurately the equation models how 
courts decide. 
 
 189 See, for example, Yeoman v Ikea U.S. West, Inc, 2013 WL 5944245, *4 (SD Cal) 
(rejecting the plaintiffs’ request that the defendants “post[ ] [class action] notice at each 
point-of-sale location” because doing so “would encourage inquiries by non-class members, 
which could interfere with [the defendants’] reputation and business”); Mark v Gawker 
Media LLC, 2015 WL 2330079, *1 (SDNY) (“Mark III”) (rejecting an overinclusive notice 
scheme in the context of an opt-in action under the FLSA because its primary effect would 
be to “advertise the alleged violations by Defendants”). 
 190 182 FRD 573 (ND Ill 1998). 
 191 See id at 578–79. 
 192 Id at 578. 
 193 See, for example, Yeoman, 2013 WL 5944245 at *6 (refusing to approve the plain-
tiffs’ request that the defendants send e-mail notice to an overbroad list of customers, not-
ing that there was “no link between individuals who may have provided their email ad-
dresses” and the relevant class). 
 194 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 22 (1960) (“The courts 
do not always refer very clearly to the economic problem posed by the cases brought before 
them but it seems probable that in the interpretation of words and phrases like ‘reasonable’ 
. . . there is some recognition, perhaps largely unconscious and certainly not very explicit, 
of the economic aspects of the questions at issue.”). 
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1. Building a Mathews-style balancing equation. 
As discussed in Part I.C, the Mathews Court introduced a 
general balancing test to evaluate procedural due process issues. 
According to the Mathews Court, the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments require additional process when the marginal ben-
efit of the process multiplied by the incremental increase in the 
probability of ensuring accurate judgment exceeds the incremen-
tal cost of the process.195 
Extrapolating from Mathews, this Section argues that courts 
implicitly tend to allow parties to publish notice in a particular 
way when the marginal benefits of providing such notice multi-
plied by the increased probability of notice reaching the individ-
ual exceeds the marginal costs of providing the notice. That is, 
courts approve a form of publication notice when 
 
(b − b*) (x2 − x1) > C2 − C1 (1) 
 
where b captures the individual’s net benefit196 from the claim if 
she opts out and litigates on her own, b* represents the individ-
ual’s net benefit from the claim as a member of the class,197 x2 
measures the expected number of class members whom a pro-
posed notice plan would notify, x1 measures the expected number 
of class members whom the next best alternative publication no-
tice would effectively notify, C2 measures the cost of publishing 
notice in the proposed form, and C1 measures the cost of the next 
best publication notice plan.198 
As in Mathews, Equation (1) measures the incremental ben-
efits and costs of providing additional or alternative notice.199 For 
 
 195 See notes 77–92 and accompanying text. 
 196 An individual’s net benefit equals the settlement or judgment she receives, minus 
the time and money costs of litigating her case. 
 197 For example, in Hughes, b ≈ $100, whereas b* = $3.57. Even if—as the statute at 
issue in Hughes requires—the defendant pays each plaintiff’s attorney’s fees regardless of 
whether she is a member of the class or whether she opts out of the class and litigates on 
her own, the individual statutory damage amounts do not exactly capture the plaintiff’s 
net benefit because they do not account for the time costs of litigation. See text accompa-
nying note 180. 
 198 For simplicity, this model assumes that, because x2 and x1 measure the expected 
number of people a notice plan will notify, b does not differ across individuals. A more 
complicated model that measures the differences in the probabilities of two notice plans 
reaching any given individual would allow for variation in b. In such a model, to capture 
the total benefits of a notice plan and compare them to the total costs, the left-hand side 
of Equation (1) would be summed over all individuals. 
 199 See Mathews, 424 US at 334–35. 
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example, if Notice Plan 1 (the next best plan) includes print ad-
vertisements in The New York Times, Notice Plan 2 (the proposed 
plan) might include print advertisements in The New York Times 
plus native social media advertisements, or alternatively Notice 
Plan 2 might include print advertisements in The Wall Street 
Journal. Likewise, C captures the total cost under each notice 
plan. As a result, if there is some baseline reputational harm to a 
defendant that it would suffer even in the absence of any FRCP 23 
notice, C1 includes this harm plus the additional costs associated 
with Notice Plan 1, whereas C2 includes the baseline harm plus 
the additional direct and reputational costs associated with No-
tice Plan 2. 
Either the parties or the court can propose alternative notice 
plans.200 Typically, the certified class creates a notice plan and 
sends the plan to the opposing party, which notes any objec-
tions.201 For example, the opposing party might object to the no-
tice’s content, to how widely (or narrowly) the class proposes to 
disseminate notice, or to which forms of media the class intends 
to use to contact potential class members.202 In turn, the class rep-
resentative responds and submits the plan to the court, which de-
cides whether to approve the notice plan and resolves outstanding 
disputes between the parties.203 Likewise, following a settlement 
class action, individual class members who failed to receive notice 
often suggest other ways in which the parties could have provided 
notice.204 Alternatively, in both settlement and nonsettlement 
class actions, the court itself can propose and consider alternative 
notice plans.205 
 
 200 Because the plaintiff bears the cost of providing notice, the parties have incentives 
to engage in strategic behavior. See Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 US 156, 177 (1974) 
(establishing that the plaintiff pays the costs of FRCP 23 notice). For example, in In re 
Scotts EZ Seed Litigation, 2015 WL 5502053 (SDNY), the plaintiffs sought to provide no-
tice using only the Internet, whereas the defendants sought to force the plaintiffs to also 
publish notice in a newspaper. Id at *1–2. 
 201 See, for example, Pitt v City of Portsmouth, Va, 221 FRD 438, 452 (ED Va 2004) 
(describing the iterative process for creating a notice plan). See also Wright, Miller, and 
Kane, 7AA Federal Practice and Procedure § 1788 (cited in note 25). 
 202 See, for example, In re Scotts EZ Seed Litigation, 2015 WL 5502053 at *1 (describ-
ing the defendants’ objection to the class representative’s plan to publish notice on the 
Internet). 
 203 For an example of a court ruling on whether to approve a plaintiff’s notice plan, 
see Tylka, 182 FRD at 575–76, 578–79. 
 204 See, for example, Hecht, 691 F3d at 225 (describing other forms of notice identified 
by a plaintiff seeking to avoid being bound by a class decision). 
 205 For an example of a court suggesting its own alternative notice plan in a nonset-
tlement class action, see Shurland, 271 FRD at 147. For an example of a court suggesting 
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2. Modeling the benefits of reducing underinclusion. 
Part II.A.1 observed that courts measure the benefits of re-
ducing underinclusion by evaluating the stakes of the litigation 
and the incremental increase in how likely a new form of notice is 
to reach class members. The left-hand side of Equation (1) cap-
tures these variables. 
First, b − b* describes how courts already measure the bene-
fit of providing notice. Because b − b* captures how an individ-
ual’s net benefit changes if she receives notice and opts out,206 
b − b* depends crucially on how each class member values the 
class’s claim. When evaluating whether a class certification pub-
lication notice plan satisfies FRCP 23(c)(2)(B), b* depends on how 
much of the uncertain class settlement or judgment the court be-
lieves each class member will receive. That is, b* depends on the 
expected value of an individual’s claim within the class. When the 
court considers settlement publication notice under 
FRCP 23(e)(1), on the other hand, the uncertainty about the value 
of the class’s claim has been resolved and b* depends on the 
known settlement value. 
Whereas b* measures the value of the claim to an individual 
as a member of the class, b measures the value of the claim to 
each individual if she opted out and litigated alone. Because 
b − b* increases as the difference between the amount the indi-
vidual would receive on her own and the value to her of the class 
settlement or expected class outcome increases, notice matters 
more when an individual class member would do much better 
bringing suit on her own.207 In contrast, as the difference between 
 
an alternative form of notice in a settlement class action, see In re National Collegiate 
Athletic Association Student-Athlete Concussion Injury Litigation, 314 FRD 580, 603 (ND 
Ill 2016). 
 206 This analysis assumes that if an individual’s net benefit from opting out, including 
the costs of litigation, exceeds her benefit from remaining a class member—that is, if 
b > b*—that individual will opt out if she receives notice. In contrast, if the individual 
expects to collect less on her own than she would as a class member—that is, if b* > b—
this analysis assumes that the individual who receives notice declines to opt out. Interest-
ingly, when b* > b, Equation (1) suggests that courts should provide less notice, such that 
the left-hand side of Equation (1) is positive. If bounded rationality causes some individu-
als who receive notice to inefficiently opt out of the class, it makes sense to limit the prob-
ability that individuals receive notice. The remainder of this Comment assumes that 
b > b*, such that failing to provide notice presents a real due process concern. 
 207 On the other hand, the more an individual class member expects to receive from 
litigating on her own, the greater the chance she already knows about the class action, 
even absent FRCP 23 notice. That is, b − b* might be correlated with the probability that 
each individual member would be notified under either notice plan. 
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how much an individual expects to receive as a member of a class 
and how much she expects to collect if she litigates on her own 
decreases—that is, as b − b* approaches zero—the value of notice 
also decreases. Intuitively, this result makes sense; the more sim-
ilar any individual’s claim is to all other class members’ claims, 
the more likely it is that the class representative protects her in-
terests and she has no need to opt out.208 
Second, x2 − x1 captures how courts tend to determine 
whether one form of publication notice is more likely to achieve 
these benefits by reaching class members than is another form. 
To measure the incremental benefits of alternative forms of no-
tice, courts consider the facts and circumstances of the case, char-
acteristics of the class, and the other “feasible and customary”209 
forms of publication notice available to the parties. As a result, in 
Equation (1), the difference between x2 and x1 depends on the next 
best notice plan that parties could use to provide publication no-
tice. The more likely the next best alternative form of publication 
notice is to actually notify potential class members, the smaller 
the difference between x2 and x1.210 
To accurately measure the relative difference between pub-
lishing notice in a new form and relying on the next best alterna-
tive, courts consider at least two details about the class and the 
case. First, courts analyze the demographics of the class and the 
nature of the claim. If the class includes individuals who, based 
on demographics, are more likely to be reached using the pro-
posed form of notice than they would be by the next best plan, the 
difference between x2 and x1 is likely to be larger. On the other 
hand, if the class includes individuals less likely to encounter 
publication in the proposed Notice Plan 2, or if the claim involves 
products or services typically associated with such a demo-
graphic, x2 likely will differ little from x1. Under such circum-
stances, the proposed form of publication notice likely will not 
change the expected number of potential class members actually 
receiving notice. 
 
 208 In that sense, when b − b* approaches zero, FRCP 23(b)(3) class members are 
more like members of a (b)(1) or (b)(2) class. See notes 37–42 and accompanying text. 
 209 Mullane, 339 US at 315. 
 210 In fact, if the parties or court miscalculate and the next best notice plan would 
actually do better than the proposed plan and increase how many class members are likely 
to receive notice, then x2 − x1 would be negative. 
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Additionally, courts measure how likely class members are to 
be aware of the case in the absence of any FRCP 23 notice. Con-
sider, for example, claims arising out of a large-scale disaster that 
receives significant press coverage. In such cases, FRCP 23 notice 
serves only a marginal role; potential class members know about 
pending litigation because of press conferences, news stories, and 
other media coverage. Because both x2 and x1 will be very close to 
the total number of potential class members—almost all potential 
class members will first receive notice elsewhere—x2 likely differs 
very little from x1. In contrast, in cases with very minimal press 
coverage, or limited coverage within the demographic that com-
prises the potential class, courts must more closely compare x2 
and x1 to evaluate the number of potential class members whom 
different forms of notice will reach. 
3. Modeling the costs of increasing overinclusion. 
Part II.A.2 showed that, when courts evaluate the costs of re-
ducing underinclusion, they measure the direct and indirect costs 
to the class, the defendant, and the public. Just as the left-hand 
side of Equation (1) models how courts already measure the ben-
efits of reducing underinclusion, the right-hand side of Equa-
tion (1) captures how courts already estimate the costs of increas-
ing overinclusion. 
In particular, C2 − C1 formalizes both the direct and indirect 
costs of providing notice to more people outside the class. First, 
the party providing notice in a proposed form—most likely the 
class—must pay direct costs to create and publish the notice. Sec-
ond, the party opposing the class suffers indirect costs of reputa-
tional harms, which depend on the general level of awareness of 
the suit and the scope of the next best notice plan. Consider a 
large class action suit against a major retailer in which the de-
fendant proposes a baseline notice plan that requires it to take 
out advertisements in nationwide newspapers. Suppose that the 
plaintiff urges the court to require the retailer to also publish tar-
geted banner ads on the Internet. The more people outside the 
class that already know about the suit before any notice is pub-
lished by the parties—that is, the greater the baseline reputa-
tional cost captured in C1 and C2—the lower the reputational 
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costs of providing increasingly overinclusive notice.211 Likewise, 
the more overinclusive the nationwide newspaper notice, the 
lower the incremental reputational costs of providing Internet 
publication notice that reaches more non–class members. 
In addition to imposing costs on the parties, publishing notice 
using additional forms of media creates externalities that affect 
the broader public in at least two related ways.212 First, increas-
ingly overinclusive notice confuses individuals outside the class 
about whether class notice applies to them, forcing them to incur 
costs to determine whether they belong to advertised classes. Sec-
ond, increasingly overinclusive notice creates a potential “boy who 
cried wolf” scenario: the more frequently individuals receive no-
tice that does not apply to them, the less likely such notice may 
be to catch their eyes when they are potential members of a class. 
* * * 
This Section explained how courts balance the costs of pub-
lishing overinclusive notice with the benefits of reaching addi-
tional class members. Building on factors that courts already con-
sider, the preceding Part adapted the Mathews balancing test to 
the context of FRCP 23 publication notice. Stated most simply, 
the adapted Mathews test predicts that courts will approve a notice 
plan when the marginal benefits of providing additional notice ex-
ceed the marginal costs. 
III.  TESTING THE MODEL: FRCP 23 AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
Part II developed a predictive model that captures how courts 
tend to decide whether to approve alternative forms of publication 
notice. To do so, Part II analyzed how courts decided whether to 
approve alternative forms of publication notice in the past. This 
Part tests Part II’s predictive model. It begins by providing an 
overview of social media and differentiating native social media 
advertisements from traditional online advertisements. Next, 
this Part surveys court decisions involving publication notice on 
social media. Based on this survey, this Part reports that courts 
 
 211 This assumes that the reputational harm exhibits diminishing marginal costs, 
such that informing the first non–class member about the suit is worse than informing the 
hundredth class member. 
 212 Mathews suggests that courts should consider these externalities and “societal 
costs” when they decide whether to require additional procedure. See Mathews, 424 US at 347. 
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frequently allow parties to use targeted social media banner ad-
vertisements to publish FRCP 23 notice. In contrast, when courts 
evaluate plans involving native social media notice, they reach 
mixed results: courts allow parties to use their Facebook pages or 
Twitter feeds to publish notice in some cases, but they prohibit 
parties from tweeting notice in others. These results raise several 
questions: Why do courts frequently allow parties to post notice 
using banner advertisements on Facebook, but not using their 
own Facebook pages? Why do courts allow—or even require—par-
ties to publish notice using native social media in some cases, but 
not in others? This Part concludes by testing whether the predic-
tive model developed in Part II answers these questions and ex-
plains these results. 
A. How Native Social Media Ads Differ from Traditional 
Advertising 
Social media transformed the Internet by bringing social net-
works online, allowing Internet users to share content with their 
friends and relatives and to expand their own social circles by con-
necting with others.213 Although each social media site has a dif-
ferent structure, purpose, and terminology,214 most sites allow users 
to create a profile; connect to, share with, and stay updated on 
people, businesses, or interests; and expand their connections.215 
On most social media sites, users can communicate with connec-
tions by publicly leaving comments on their profiles, broadly shar-
ing content, or using the site’s private messaging system.216 
Initially, companies advertised online using targeted banner 
ads—the standard-sized rectangular advertisements located 
above websites.217 To more effectively reach potential customers 
with such banner advertisements, companies track how Internet 
users move around the web.218 In turn, content providers sell ban-
ner space to outside advertisers; the price of the ad depends on 
 
 213 See Laura Scaife, Handbook of Social Media and the Law § 1.2 (Informa Law 2015). 
 214 For a fairly comprehensive list of prominent social media platforms, see id § 1.5.2–4. 
 215 See danah m. boyd and Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, 
and Scholarship, 13 J Computer-Mediated Commun 210, 211 (2008). See also Scaife, 
Handbook of Social Media and the Law § 1.2.1 (cited in note 213). 
 216 See boyd and Ellison, 13 J Computer-Mediated Commun at 213 (cited in note 215). 
 217 See Manjoo, Fall of the Banner Ad (cited in note 16). 
 218 See id. 
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traffic to the website.219 Despite auspicious beginnings,220 banner 
ads now rarely capture people’s attention; some studies estimate 
that less than 0.08 percent of Internet users who see a banner ad 
click on it.221 
While some companies still advertise on social media sites 
using banner-type ads,222 most companies now use their social 
media presence to integrate their advertisements into social me-
dia platforms.223 These “native ads,” many of which “look[ ] just as 
pretty as a photo from your friends,” appear side-by-side with 
other content posted on social media.224 Native ads are differenti-
ated from other forms of online advertising because they are inte-
grated into the surrounding content.225 Although the definition of 
native advertisements is fuzzy, social media advertisements that 
appear in a user’s feed—sponsored tweets, suggested Facebook 
posts, and Instagram advertisements, for example—are native 
ads; banner advertisements at the top or the side of social media 
pages are not. Facebook, for example, urges companies to pur-
chase Facebook ads precisely because they are so well integrated: 
“People use Facebook to discover what’s new with their friends, 
family and the things they care about. And your ads show up 
alongside these stories—seamlessly.”226 Moreover, by paying social 
media sites an additional fee, companies can increase the chances 
that users connected with the company—and users connected 
with those users—see their ads alongside pictures and content 
posted by friends.227 
 
 219 See id. 
 220 For a fascinating account of how AT&T developed the first banner ad, see Rebecca 
Greenfield, The Trailblazing, Candy-Colored History of the Online Banner Ad (Fast Com-
pany, Oct 27, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/AQ2N-TH7P. 
 221 See id (reporting estimated click-through rates). The low click-through rate is po-
tentially problematic in the class action notice context, because class action banner adver-
tisements link to websites with additional information. See, for example, Brown v Sega 
Amusements, U.S.A., Inc, 2015 WL 1062409, *2 & n 4 (SDNY). 
 222 For example, although Facebook’s “Right Column” ads are not located at the top 
of the page like traditional banner advertisements, they are separate from the rest of the 
user’s social content. See Ads Guide (Facebook), archived at http://perma.cc/W7P2-QBZG. 
For a fairly comprehensive catalogue of how different social media sites allow companies 
to advertise, see Online Ads: A Guide to Online Ad Types and Formats (WordStream), 
archived at http://perma.cc/HGG5-37PP. 
 223 See Manjoo, Fall of the Banner Ad (cited in note 16). 
 224 See id. 
 225 See Native Advertising: A Guide for Businesses (cited in note 17). 
 226 How People See Ads (cited in note 17). See also Hello, Brands. (cited in note 19) 
(“Sponsored Posts are just like regular Tumblr posts—just way more visible.”). 
 227 See, for example, Boost Your Posts (Facebook), archived at http://perma.cc/7V4M 
-2RSE. See also Lauren Drell, Can Promoted Posts Help Your Business? (Mashable, July 8, 
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B. Social Media and Due Process 
Because social media changed the way people and businesses 
interact,228 parties increasingly seek to publish notice using the 
Internet and social media.229 This Section analyzes cases in which 
courts have considered whether due process requirements al-
lowed parties to use social media to publish notice. Although most 
courts allow parties to publish notice using targeted social media 
banner ads, courts allow or compel only some parties to provide 
notice using native social media advertisements. This Section ex-
amines two questions facing litigants seeking to publish notice 
using social media and future courts evaluating publication notice 
plans: Why do courts allow parties to publish notice using tar-
geted social media banner ads more frequently than they allow 
parties to publish notice using native social media ads? And in 
what types of cases do courts allow parties to use native social 
media advertisements to publish notice? 
1. Courts tend to allow parties to use targeted social media 
banner advertisements to publish FRCP 23 notice. 
Despite some initial hesitation,230 courts now consistently al-
low parties to publish Internet notice using banner advertise-
ments, as long as the advertisements target the class’s demo-
graphic.231 In Evans v Linden Research, Inc,232 for example, the 
plaintiffs, a class of individuals who participated in an Internet 
role-playing game called Second Life, brought suit against Linden, 
the company that operates the game, because they claimed that 
Linden terminated their accounts without compensating them for 
 
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/A8YY-KKQT (explaining promoted Facebook posts and 
measuring their impact). 
 228 See Scaife, Handbook of Social Media and the Law § 1.1.1 (cited in note 213). 
 229 See Coe, Social Media Class Notices Gain Traction (cited in note 15). 
 230 See, for example, Mangone v First USA Bank, 206 FRD 222, 233 (SD Ill 2001) 
(“There is no requirement under due process or the federal rules requiring dissemination 
of [notice] over the Internet.”). 
 231 See, for example, In re Pool Products Distribution Market Antitrust Litigation, 310 
FRD 300, 317–18 (ED La 2015) (concluding that advertising the settlement notice plan on 
Google and Facebook in the relevant region adequately made up for the lack of individual 
notice); McCabe v Six Continents Hotels, Inc, 2015 WL 3990915, *11–12 (ND Cal) (approv-
ing a notice plan that included “targeted Facebook and online banner ads”); In re Imprelis 
Herbicide Marketing, Sales Practices and Products Liability Litigation, 296 FRD 351, 363 
& n 6, 372 (ED Pa 2013) (accepting the parties’ notice plan, which included advertisements 
“on AOL, Facebook, Yahoo!, Google, and other sites”). 
 232 2013 WL 5781284 (ND Cal). 
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the value of the items they had purchased in the game.233 In addi-
tion to proposing contacting class members through e-mail, the 
parties proposed publishing notice on six websites correlated with 
visits to Second Life, providing banner-advertisement notice on 
the Facebook pages of individuals who “liked” Second Life, and 
including online banner advertisements on The Alphaville Her-
ald, a website about Second Life.234 Because the notice plan tar-
geted websites the class visited and created banner advertise-
ments aimed at the class, the court approved the parties’ 
settlement notice plan.235 
When parties fail to target notice plans based on the de-
mographics of class members, however, courts more frequently 
refuse to approve publication notice relying on banner advertise-
ments. In Brown v Sega Amusements, U.S.A., Inc,236 for example, 
the plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of a class of individuals 
throughout the United States who played arcade games that the 
defendant had preprogrammed to prevent players from win-
ning.237 As part of a settlement agreement, the parties proposed 
providing notice to class members using “online and mobile phone 
advertisements.”238 The court rejected the parties’ plan because it 
lacked specificity and did not target the banner ads based on de-
mographic information about the class.239 Somewhat surprisingly, 
the court worried about underinclusion: if the parties did not tar-
get their notice based on information about the class, the court 
could not conclude that the social media banner ads would actu-
ally reach any class members.240 
 
 233 Id at *1. 
 234 Id at *3. 
 235 See id at *5. 
 236 2015 WL 1062409 (SDNY). 
 237 Id at *1. 
 238 Id at *2. 
 239 See id. 
 240 See Brown, 2015 WL 1062409 at *2. The courts in Flynn v Sony Electronics, Inc, 
2015 WL 128039 (SD Cal), and Jermyn v Best Buy Stores, LP, 2010 WL 5187746 (SDNY), 
similarly declined to allow parties to publish notice using native social media ads because 
they worried about underinclusion. See notes 246–48, 254–57, and accompanying text. In 
contrast, in Mark v Gawker Media LLC, 2014 WL 5557489 (SDNY) (“Mark II”), the court 
rejected the defendants’ argument that social media notice would be underinclusive be-
cause the plaintiffs did not provide evidence that any class members use social media. 
Instead, the court found it “unrealistic” that former interns of an online news site would 
not have a social media presence. See id at *4. 
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2. Courts allow only some parties to use native social 
media advertisements to publish FRCP 23 notice. 
Because social media sites have introduced native advertise-
ments relatively recently, few courts have addressed whether 
FRCP 23 allows parties to publish notice using native social me-
dia. This Section briefly describes some examples of the relatively 
small set of decided cases241 and shows that although courts tend 
to allow parties to publish notice using targeted social media ban-
ner ads, courts allow or compel only some parties to publish notice 
using native social media. 
In Jermyn v Best Buy Stores, LP,242 for example, the plaintiff 
brought a class action suit on behalf of Best Buy’s New York cus-
tomers alleging that, despite Best Buy’s price matching policy, 
Best Buy failed to honor its competitors’ best prices.243 The plain-
tiff proposed a notice plan that required Best Buy to add a hyper-
link from its website to the litigation website, post a thread about 
the class action in its discussion forum, and tweet notice about 
the class action using its Twitter account, among other require-
ments.244 The court rejected the plaintiff’s Twitter proposal be-
cause it would be both over- and underinclusive. First, the court 
found that providing notice via Twitter would be overinclusive be-
cause Best Buy could not ensure that its tweets would reach only 
customers in New York.245 Because the court considered tweets to 
 
 241 To identify native social media advertisement cases, a Westlaw search was per-
formed on February 21, 2016, for cases containing the phrase “Rule 23” and the name of 
at least one of several social media platforms (as well as the phrase “social media”) in the 
same sentence as the word “notice.” After omitting cases in which the parties used social 
media only to publish banner advertisements or to provide individual notice (for example, 
by sending private Facebook messages), cases in which the court’s docket and opinion pro-
vides no indication of how the parties used social media, and cases that contain the 
searched terms but do not involve relevant issues, the search identified ten cases in which 
the parties attempted to provide notice using native social media advertisements. The 
court allowed or compelled the parties to provide notice using native social media ads in 
six cases and prohibited such notice in four cases. Of the ten native social media adver-
tisement cases identified, this Comment’s model accurately predicts how the court will 
evaluate the parties’ notice plans in nine. The case this Comment’s model misidentifies, 
Angell v City of Oakland, 2015 WL 65501 (ND Cal), is discussed in more detail in 
Part IV.A. 
 242 2010 WL 5187746 (SDNY). 
 243 Id at *1. 
 244 Id at *2–9. 
 245 See id at *5–7. 
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be “a form of individual notice (akin to notice via mail),”246 it hes-
itated to approve an overbroad individual notification plan.247 Sec-
ond, the court found that providing notice over Twitter would be 
underinclusive because the plaintiff did not demonstrate that 
“even a single class member” followed Best Buy on Twitter.248 In-
stead, the court required Best Buy to publish notice on BestBuy.com 
because it determined that “at least some of the class members 
will be familiar with Best Buy’s website.”249 
In Flynn v Sony Electronics, Inc,250 the court prevented the 
plaintiffs from publishing notice using native social media adver-
tisements because such notice would be underinclusive.251 There, 
the plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of a class of consumers who 
purchased allegedly defective notebook computers from the de-
fendant.252 After the court certified the class, the plaintiffs pro-
posed providing notice through a case-specific Facebook page that 
would “allow class members to become ‘friends’ or ‘like’ the page 
so that they [could] receive updates and posts related to the litiga-
tion.”253 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ plan because the Facebook 
page would not notify class members of the action and would be 
valuable only if class members already knew about the litiga-
tion.254 Although the defendant argued that the Facebook page 
would reach too many non–class members,255 the court, like the 
Brown court,256 worried exclusively about underinclusion.257 
 
 246 Jermyn, 2010 WL 5187746 at *6. Although the Jermyn court’s analogy of tweeting 
to sending postal mail at first seems inaccurate, it is not entirely clear whether courts 
should treat native social media advertisements as individual or publication notices. On 
the one hand, native social media advertisements interrupt and take up space on other 
websites, much as print advertisements, which are considered publication notices, inter-
rupt and take up space in newspapers. On the other hand, native social media advertise-
ments are more narrowly targeted, much as mass mailings are directed at a limited group 
of recipients. 
 247 Id at *6–8. Generally, courts are especially reluctant to approve overbroad per-
sonal notification plans. See, for example, In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litiga-
tion, 818 F2d 145, 169 (2d Cir 1987). 
 248 Jermyn, 2010 WL 5187746 at *5–7. 
 249 Id at *8. 
 250 2015 WL 128039 (SD Cal). 
 251 See id at *4. 
 252 Id at *1. 
 253 Id at *4. 
 254 Flynn, 2015 WL 128039 at *4 (“Class members actively searching for notice is not 
what was intended by requiring notice in a class action.”). 
 255 See id. 
 256 See note 240 and accompanying text. 
 257 See Flynn, 2015 WL 128039 at *4. 
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In contrast, in Mark v Gawker Media LLC258 (“Mark III”), the 
court rejected the plaintiffs’ plan to publish notice using native 
social media posts because it feared such notice would be overin-
clusive.259 The plaintiffs had brought an opt-in suit against 
Gawker for violating federal and state labor laws.260 Unlike in 
Jermyn,261 the court initially granted the plaintiffs’ plan to pro-
vide notice on social media sites by creating dedicated social me-
dia pages.262 When the plaintiffs sought to provide social media 
notice through native posts on Tumblr, Reddit, and publicly avail-
able pages on Twitter, LinkedIn, and Facebook, however, the 
court rejected the plan as “lack[ing] any realistic notion of specif-
ically targeting its notice to individuals with opt-in rights.”263 The 
court reasoned that, because the plaintiffs’ proposed notice plan 
would be overinclusive, it would serve to punish the defendants 
rather than to actually reach class members.264 Eventually, the 
court allowed the plaintiffs to provide notice to opt-in class mem-
bers by sending private messages—rather than by using native 
social media advertisements—on Facebook, LinkedIn, and 
Twitter.265 The court hinted, however, that it might allow parties 
 
 258 2015 WL 2330079 (SDNY). 
 259 Id at *1. 
 260 Mark v Gawker Media LLC, 2014 WL 4058417, *1–2 (SDNY) (“Mark I”). Although 
this Comment evaluates opt-out publication notice, the adapted Mathews equation applies 
at least to some extent to opt-in suits as well. For example, by scaling the left-hand and 
right-hand sides of Equation (1) to reflect the number of people inside and outside the 
class, Equation (1) can be used to analyze notice under opt-in statutes like the FLSA. Be-
cause the number of people on the left-hand side of the equation—the former Gawker in-
terns—was small, but the number of people on the right-hand side—everyone else who 
might encounter notice on social media—was large, the relatively higher risk of overinclu-
sion might explain why the court would not approve a public-facing social media plan. 
Note, however, that opt-in suits raise due process concerns to a lesser extent than do opt-
out FRCP 23 class actions, because judgment on one class member’s claims in an opt-in 
suit does not bind other potential class members or prevent them from bringing suit later 
on their own. See In re Penthouse Executive Club Compensation Litigation, 2014 WL 
185628, *7 (SDNY). As a result, to the extent that b and b* implicitly include some benefits 
from preserving an individual’s due process rights to opt out, Equation (1) would need to 
be modified for the opt-in context. 
 261 See notes 242–49 and accompanying text. 
 262 See Mark II, 2014 WL 5557489 at *3–5. 
 263 Mark III, 2015 WL 2330079 at *1. 
 264 See id. 
 265 See Mark v Gawker Media LLC, 2015 WL 2330274, *1 (SDNY) (“Mark IV”) (ap-
proving the plaintiffs’ revised notice plan). See also Andrea M. Paparella, Liddle & Robinson, 
LLP, Letter to Alison J. Nathan, United States District Judge, Southern District of New 
York, Mark v Gawker Media LLC, Docket No 13-04347, *1 (SDNY filed Apr 9, 2015) (sub-
mitting a revised notice plan requesting that the court “authorize Plaintiffs to disseminate 
Notice by utilizing Twitter, Facebook, and LinkedIn to send ‘private, personalized notifi-
cations’ to former Gawker interns ‘not reachable by other means’”). 
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to use native social media advertisements to publish notice in opt-
out consumer class actions,266 because of either the larger class 
size or the more fundamental due process concerns implicated by 
an opt-out procedure.267 
Courts’ decisions about whether to allow parties to use native 
social media ads to publish class action notice are extremely fact 
dependent. As a result, despite the holdings in Jermyn, Flynn, 
and Mark III, other courts hold that FRCP 23 allows parties to 
use native social media posts to publish notice. In Kelly v Phiten 
USA, Inc,268 for example, the parties settled a suit in which a class 
of consumers who purchased Phiten’s fitness accessories alleged 
that they did so because Phiten made false statements about their 
health benefits.269 As part of the settlement, the court allowed 
Phiten to publish notice on its Facebook page, causing “more than 
75,000 fans” of the page—though not necessarily Phiten custom-
ers—to receive an alert on their Facebook homepages.270 Simi-
larly, in In re National Collegiate Athletic Association Student-
Athlete Concussion Injury Litigation271 (“In re NCAA”), the parties 
settled a suit in which current and former college athletes alleged 
they suffered injuries because of how the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA) addressed concussions.272 Although 
neither the NCAA nor the plaintiff class suggested publishing no-
tice using native social media posts, the court emphasized the im-
portance of “reach[ing] as many class members as possible.”273 As 
a result, on its own initiative, the court required the parties to 
 
 266 See Mark III, 2015 WL 2330079 at *1 n 1 (“[T]he Court notes that the potential 
opt-in class has never been represented as being as broad as would be found in a consumer 
class action.”). 
 267 See note 260. 
 268 277 FRD 564 (SD Iowa 2011). 
 269 Id at 567. 
 270 Id at 569–70. Such notice constitutes native social media advertisement because 
the alerts appeared on users’ home pages. For other examples of consumer class actions in 
which courts allowed the parties to publish notice using native social media posts, see 
Mirakay v Dakota Growers Pasta Co, 2014 WL 5358987, *2–3, 11 (D NJ) (describing the 
parties’ approved plan to reach class members who purchased pasta online or in stores by 
publishing settlement notice using “social posts on Twitter” and “targeted sponsored news 
feeds on Facebook and Twitter”); In re Electronic Books Antitrust Litigation, 2014 WL 
1641699, *2 (SDNY) (describing the parties’ approved notice plan, which included posts 
on “relevant Twitter accounts”); Fraser v Asus Computer International, 2013 WL 621929, 
*3–4 (ND Cal) (allowing the parties to publish notice about the settlement of claims in-
volving malfunctioning tablets on the defendant’s Facebook page, among other places). 
 271 314 FRD 580 (ND Ill 2016). 
 272 Id at 583. 
 273 Id at 603. 
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notify class members using “the NCAA’s Facebook pages and 
Twitter accounts,” among other methods.274 
Taken together, these cases suggest that courts decide to ap-
prove or deny native social media notice plans based on a fact-
dependent analysis of the class and the claim. The next Section 
analyzes whether the adapted Mathews equation explains these 
results. 
C. Testing Whether the Predictive Model Explains How Courts 
Evaluate Social Media Publication Notice 
The previous Section showed that courts tend to allow parties 
to publish notice on social media using targeted banner ads, but 
courts only sometimes allow parties to publish notice using native 
social media posts. If, as Part II hypothesized, courts implicitly 
rely on the predictive model to decide whether to allow a party to 
publish notice in a particular way, then the model should explain 
these results. 
First, consider Part III.B’s observation that courts frequently 
allow parties to publish notice using targeted social media banner 
ads, but only sometimes allow parties to publish notice using na-
tive social media posts. If these courts implicitly relied on the pre-
dictive model, they would have allowed parties to publish notice 
using native social media ads in addition to targeted banner ads 
only if: 
 
(b − b*) (xN − xTB) > CN − CTB (2) 
 
where b − b* measures the difference between the individual’s net 
benefit from her claim if she opts out and litigates on her own and 
her benefit from the claim as a member of the class, xN − xTB cap-
tures the increased number of potential class members whom na-
tive social media posts will reach relative to the number of class 
members whom targeted banner advertisements will notify,275 
 
 274 Id. 
 275 Because native social media ads tend to be the marginal and controversial compo-
nent of a notice plan, the subsequent analysis assumes that, as in Flynn, the next best 
form of notice includes targeted banner advertisements. See Flynn, 2015 WL 128039 at 
*1. That is, the next best form of notice is exactly the same in all respects, but excludes 
native social media ads. In symbols, the analysis assumes that pN = pTB + ∂, where ∂ cap-
tures the additional probability that native ads will notify class members not already 
reached by other methods. If the next best form of notice is instead newspaper ads, as in 
Jermyn, Equation (2) would measure the incremental increase in cost and probability of 
successfully notifying class members between native social media posts and newspaper 
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and CN − CTB describes the increased cost of publishing notice using 
native social media ads and banner ads relative to the cost of 
providing notice using only targeted banner ads on social media. 
Rearranging Equation (2),276 in cases in which the court allowed 
the parties to publish notice using targeted banner ads but pro-
hibited the use of native social media posts, one would expect to 
find that: 
xN −  xTB < 
CN - CTB
b - b*  (3) 
The Jermyn, Flynn, and Mark III courts’ decisions are consistent 
with Equation (3). In Jermyn and Flynn, for example, because the 
courts worried that native social media notice would be underin-
clusive,277 they valued the left-hand side of Equation (3) at zero.278 
As a result, because CN − CTB must be greater than zero,279 the 
Jermyn and Flynn courts rejected the plaintiffs’ proposed native 
social media notice plans. Likewise, the Mark III court refused to 
allow the plaintiff to publish notice using native social media be-
cause it believed that the “plan appear[ed] calculated to punish 
Defendants rather than provide notice of opt-in rights.”280 Put dif-
ferently, the Mark III court estimated that the difference between 
CN − CTB dominated any increase in xN − xTB. 
Next, consider Part III.B’s observation that courts allow par-
ties to publish notice using native social media in only certain 
types of cases. If courts do rely on the predictive model to evaluate 
publication notice plans, then in cases in which the court allows 
the parties to publish notice using native social media, one should 
find that: 
 
ads. See Jermyn, 2010 WL 5187746 at *5. While the value of the variables would change, 
the analysis would remain the same. 
 276 This requires the additional assumption that b ≠ b* to avoid dividing by zero. See 
note 206. 
 277 See Jermyn, 2010 WL 5187746 at *5–7 (noting that the plaintiff did not prove that 
a single class member followed Best Buy on Twitter); Flynn, 2015 WL 128039 at *4 (re-
jecting the plaintiffs’ plan to create a case-specific Facebook page because it would reach 
only class members who already knew about the class action). 
 278 That is, they concluded that using native social media ads would not increase the 
probability that any class member would receive notice. Because the courts doubted that 
native ads would reach any additional class members, and because xN exceeds xTB only by 
∂, the number of additional class members whom native ads would reach, the courts as-
sumed that xN did not differ from xTB. 
 279 Given that CN contains CTB, even if notice by native social media ads results in no 
incremental reputational harms, the parties would incur incremental time costs in creat-
ing and sending the additional notice. 
 280 Mark III, 2015 WL 2330079 at *1.  
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xN −  xTB >
CN - CTB
b – b*  (4) 
In all but one case281 in which a court allowed or compelled par-
ties to publish notice using native social media, Equation (4) accu-
rately predicts the results. In Mirakay v Dakota Growers Pasta 
Co282 and Fraser v Asus Computer International,283 for example, the 
courts emphasized that some class members purchased products 
online, suggesting that native social media ads would incremen-
tally increase the likelihood that such class members received no-
tice.284 That is, the courts implicitly estimated a relatively large 
positive value for xN − xTB. In Kelly, the native social media post 
reached at most Phiten’s seventy-five thousand Facebook fans,285 
suggesting that any increase in CN − CTB because of reputational 
harm would be small relative to the reputational costs incurred 
in a case like Jermyn or Mark, in which native social media notice 
would reach a substantially more overinclusive population. In 
Jermyn, for example, the proportion of Best Buy’s followers on 
Twitter who were injured by its price matching policy in New York 
was likely much lower than the proportion of Phiten’s Facebook 
fans who had purchased a Phiten product. Finally, in In re Elec-
tronic Books Antitrust Litigation286 and In re NCAA, large, highly 
publicized suits involving Apple’s e-book pricing and the NCAA’s 
handling of concussions, respectively, the courts emphasized that 
the class action had already received significant media cover-
age.287 As a result, the defendants would suffer relatively less in-
cremental reputational harm than the defendants in less well-
publicized cases like Jermyn. 
 
 281 See Angell, 2015 WL 65501 at *4. For additional discussion, see notes 288–95 and 
accompanying text. 
 282 2014 WL 5358987 (D NJ). 
 283 2013 WL 621929 (ND Cal). 
 284 See Mirakay, 2014 WL 5358987 at *1; Fraser, 2013 WL 621929 at *1. See also 
Complaint, Fraser v Asus Computer International, Docket No 12-00652, *4, 7 (ND Cal filed 
Feb 9, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 447652) (noting that Asus engaged in a 
Facebook advertising campaign for its product and that the named plaintiff purchased the 
product from Amazon.com). 
 285 See Kelly, 277 FRD at 569. 
 286 2014 WL 1641699 (SDNY). 
 287 See id at *5 (“This was widely reported news just nine months ago, and has con-
tinued to make news as the litigation develops.”); In re NCAA, 314 FRD at 603 (“[I]t is 
anticipated that class members will learn of the settlement through news coverage of the 
wide-reaching settlement.”). 
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Calculated based on the facts in Angell v City of Oakland,288 
on the other hand, Equation (4) predicts that the court would hold 
that FRCP 23 prevents the parties from providing notice using 
native social media ads. In Angell, the court confronted a settle-
ment class of five hundred to one thousand members of Occupy 
Oakland who alleged that the city falsely detained, arrested, and 
imprisoned them.289 The class included a relatively small set of 
plaintiffs, and the settlement awarded each class member a rela-
tively small sum of money.290 Because the reputational costs of 
providing overinclusive notice were high (the suit raised serious 
allegations against the Oakland police)291 and because the likeli-
hood that native social media notice would reach more class mem-
bers was low (parties had “compiled a comprehensive and up-
dated contact list for class members,” including many phone 
numbers and e-mail addresses),292 the left-hand side of Equa-
tion (4) was likely less than the right-hand side. Despite the 
model’s prediction that the court would not allow the parties to 
provide native social media notice, however, the court allowed the 
parties to “disseminat[e] information regarding the settlement 
agreement on social media.”293 
Because Angell provides few details about the native social 
media notice the court approved, it is difficult to determine 
whether and why the model failed to predict the court’s decision. 
If, for example, the court allowed or required the Oakland Police 
Department to tweet notice about the settlement to its followers, 
then the model erred.294 On the other hand, there are at least 
three scenarios or additional sets of facts under which the model 
accurately predicted the court’s behavior. First, if the parties used 
social media very narrowly to contact only class members, then 
the costs of social media notice likely differed little from other al-
ternative notice plans. As a result, even a small increase in the 
 
 288 2015 WL 65501 (ND Cal). 
 289 Id at *1–3. 
 290 As certified, the class contained around 360 people. Id at *3. Although the parties 
settled for $1.36 million, after accounting for attorney’s fees and class representative 
awards, each class member would receive about $2,600. Id at *3, 9. 
 291 See id at *2–3. 
 292 Angell, 2015 WL 65501 at *10. 
 293 Id at *10–11. 
 294 In such a situation, CN would be significantly greater than CTB. 
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likelihood of notifying class members would justify the court’s de-
cision.295 Second, if some individual class members suffered par-
ticularly grievous individual injuries such that their claims dif-
fered significantly from the class settlement amount, then the 
large value of b − b* for those individuals would decrease the 
right-hand side of Equation (4). Third, if there was widespread 
press coverage about the suit and settlement even before the par-
ties published any class action notices, then the marginal reputa-
tional cost was likely minimal. 
Even though the model likely failed to predict the court’s 
holding in Angell, this analysis demonstrates that the model can 
help explain when courts will allow parties to publish notice using 
social media. Moreover, in most cases, the model got it right: 
When the marginal benefits of social media notice exceed the mar-
ginal costs, courts approve native social media publication notice 
plans. In contrast, when the marginal costs outweigh the benefits, 
courts hold that FRCP 23 prevents parties from publishing notice 
using native social media. 
IV.  APPLYING THE MODEL: HOW COURTS WILL AND SHOULD 
EVALUATE FUTURE PUBLICATION NOTICE 
Part III.C tested this Comment’s predictive model on a new 
set of social media cases to demonstrate that courts do implicitly 
use a balancing equation to evaluate publication notice plans. Be-
cause the model explains how courts behaved in the past, litigants 
can use the predictive model to anticipate whether courts will ap-
prove their native social media publication notice plans in the fu-
ture. But just as litigants need guidance on how courts will eval-
uate publication notice, courts need a principled way to think 
about whether to approve future notice plans because settlement 
classes are now common296 and new forms of publication notice 
 
 295 In fact, if the parties could target their social media communications, thereby re-
ducing the risk of overinclusion, native social media posts would likely be an extremely 
appealing form of notice, because Occupy Wall Street (the movement that led to offshoots 
like Occupy Oakland) communicated so effectively using social media. See Rachel Metz 
and Tom Simonite, The Anatomy of the Occupy Wall Street Movement on Twitter (MIT 
Technology Review, July 1, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/UF62-NMT3. 
 296 See Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 Geo Wash 
L Rev 951, 952 (2014) (noting that “[i]n modern class action practice, most class actions 
are certified not for litigation, but for settlement”); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical 
Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J Empirical Legal Stud 811, 
819 (2010) (noting that before 1997, when the Supreme Court decided Amchem Products, 
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are likely to become more popular.297 This Part uses the predictive 
model developed and tested above to forecast how courts will—
and should—decide whether FRCP 23 allows or requires parties 
to provide notice using native social media advertisements. In so 
doing, this Part provides guidance for future litigants and future 
courts. 
A. When Should Courts Allow or Require Parties to Publish 
Notice Using Native Social Media Advertisements? 
Suppose a court faces a settlement class seeking approval of 
a notice plan under FRCP 23(e)(1). The parties ask the court to 
approve a plan that notifies potential class members by mailing 
notice to individuals whom the parties can identify with reasonable 
effort, placing banner advertisements on Facebook, and tweeting 
details of the settlement agreement to individuals who follow the 
company on Twitter. 
Recall that Equation (2) showed that courts should allow na-
tive social media notice when (b − b*) (xN − xTB) > CN − CTB. Imag-
ine that the class action involves a well-publicized claim involving 
a technological product, such that the reputational harm captured 
in CTB is already high. Additionally, suppose empirical studies 
demonstrate that people in the class’s demographic are much 
more likely to notice native social media ads than they are to no-
tice banner advertisements, such that xN − xTB is positive and 
large.298 In such a situation, the benefits of allowing the parties to 
 
Inc v Windsor, 521 US 591 (1997), “it was uncertain whether the Federal Rules even per-
mitted settlement classes,” but reporting that in 2006 and 2007, more than half of all class 
action settlements were settled at the time of certification). 
 297 See April 2015: Class Action Litigation Update (cited in note 20) (“The ubiquitous 
use of social media has increasingly led plaintiffs distributing class notice to seek approval 
to use social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter.”). 
 298 When courts measure xN and xTB, they must consider not only whether the adver-
tisement reaches class members, but also whether the ad makes an impression on class 
members. That is, even the best-targeted ads are meaningless in the context of FRCP 23 
if no one notices them. For now, people appear to be much more likely to act on or recall 
native social media ads than targeted banner ads. See The Next Steps for Ads on Instagram: 
New Formats, Increased Relevance, Broader Availability (Instagram), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6U77-VLKZ (reporting that Nielsen estimated that people exhibited 2.8 
times better recall when they viewed native ads on Instagram than when they viewed 
ordinary online ads). As a result, given the same reach, courts should prefer notice plans 
that utilize native advertisements rather than banner ads. Yet the future is unpredictable, 
and native ads could go the way of banner advertisements. One additional benefit of this 
Comment’s predictive model, then, is its flexibility. So long as litigants and courts can 
roughly estimate probabilities, costs, and benefits, they can apply this model to new forms 
of notice in the future. 
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provide publication notice using native social media ads likely ex-
ceed the costs, and courts will and should allow the parties to 
tweet publication notice. Moreover, because the Supreme Court 
implicitly allows lower courts to require parties to provide notice 
by publication,299 so long as a court determines that the increase 
in xN − xTB outweighs the increase in CN − CTB, then the court 
should, according to Mathews, require the opposing party to pub-
lish notice using native social media.300 
In contrast, Equation (3) suggests that courts will not and 
should not allow parties to publish notice using native social me-
dia ads when, for a fixed level of benefits, the incremental costs 
increase more quickly than the incremental likelihood of class 
members receiving notice. For example, courts should be more 
wary about allowing parties to publish native social media notice 
when the class is small relative to the number of non–class mem-
bers, when the claim involves class members unlikely to receive 
notice on social media,301 or when the defendant faces significant 
reputational harms. 
B. Can Parties Provide Publication Notice Using Native Social 
Media Advertisements Alone? 
Suppose that parties involved in a class action related to the 
use of a social media site reach a settlement and provide publica-
tion notice under FRCP 23(e)(1) only by tweeting notice to the 
 
 299 See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc v Sanders, 437 US 340, 355 n 22 (1978) (acknowledg-
ing that “a number of courts have required defendants in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions to 
enclose notices in their own periodic mailings to class members” and collecting cases). For 
an example of a lower court requiring publication of notice over First Amendment objec-
tions, see In re Domestic Air Transportation Antitrust Litigation, 141 FRD 534, 551–52 
(ND Ga 1992) (reporting and rejecting defendant airlines’ argument that, if the court 
forced them to publish notice in their in-flight magazines, the court would violate their 
First Amendment rights). 
 300 For an example of a court requiring the parties to publish native social media no-
tice, see generally In re NCAA, 314 FRD 580. In that case, current and former collegiate 
athletes relinquished any future claims against the NCAA regarding how it monitored 
concussions in exchange for the NCAA creating a medical monitoring fund and changing 
its concussion protocols. Id at 585–87. Because some college athletes suffered more severe 
injuries than others, b likely differed significantly from b* for some individuals, meaning 
that the due process benefits of providing notice were significant. Moreover, because of 
wide-ranging news coverage of the settlement independent of any FRCP 23 notice, CN 
likely differed very little from CTB. See id at 602–03. As a result, the court properly re-
quired the parties to provide notice using native social media posts. See id. 
 301 The nature of the claim might indicate whether class members are likely to be 
reached on social media. For example, in a claim involving medical devices associated with 
certain demographics, class members might not be likely to receive notice on social media. 
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site’s followers. Once the litigation is resolved, a member of the 
class brings suit against the defendant, alleging the same claims 
that the parties settled in the class action. The individual argues 
that because the parties only tweeted publication notice—rather 
than publishing notice in a newspaper like USA Today—they 
failed to comply with FRCP 23(c)(2)(B) and violated her due pro-
cess rights.302 That is, the plaintiff argues that the parties should 
have done more than provide notice using native social media ads. 
Should the court allow her claim to proceed, or did native social 
media advertisements alone satisfy FRCP 23(c)(2)(B)’s publica-
tion notice requirement? 
The answer here relies on Equation (1),303 but with a twist. 
Rather than measuring the number of individuals reached by na-
tive social media notice relative to the number of individuals 
whom print ads would reach, the court should measure whether 
the benefits of print ads relative to the benefits of native social 
media notice alone exceed the costs of print ads. That is, the court 
should evaluate whether: 
 
(b − b*) (xUSA − xN) > CUSA − CN (5) 
 
where xUSA and xN reflect the expected number of class members 
each notice plan would reach, and CUSA and CN remain the cost of 
each plan. 
Depending on the demographics of the class and the nature 
of the claim, additional publication notice might cause CUSA − CN 
to increase more quickly than xUSA − xN. For example, suppose 
that nearly all class members follow the company on Twitter and 
that costly advertisements in USA Today would reach a substan-
tially overinclusive set of individuals without reaching any addi-
tional members of the class. Under such assumptions, because 
CUSA − CN increases more quickly than xUSA − xN, the court will 
hold that native social media notice alone satisfied 
FRCP 23(c)(2)(B) and will prevent the plaintiff from continuing to 
litigate her claim. 
 
 302 Recall that courts evaluate FRCP 23(e)(1) settlement class notice under 
FRCP 23(c)(2)(B). See text accompanying notes 54–55. 
 303 According to Equation (1), courts should allow parties to publish notice according 
to Notice Plan 2 (the proposed plan) when (b – b*) (x2 – x1) > C2 – C1. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Comment hypothesized that courts have implicitly eval-
uated whether publication notice satisfies FRCP 23 using a 
Mathews-type balancing test. By developing a predictive model to 
analyze how past courts have determined whether to allow par-
ties to publish notice and then testing the model using social me-
dia cases, this Comment verified that courts can, should, and do 
balance the costs of over- and underinclusive publication notice. 
In turn, this Comment used the model to predict circumstances 
in which future courts will allow or require parties to publish no-
tice using native social media ads. Because a balancing equation 
ensures that parties provide “the best notice that is practicable”304 
in a form that “is not substantially less likely to bring home notice 
than other of the feasible and customary substitutes,”305 this Com-
ment’s predictive model provides guidance to litigants and future 
courts when the social media notice of today becomes the newspa-
per publication notice of tomorrow. 
 
 304 FRCP 23(c)(2)(B). 
 305 Mullane, 339 US at 315. 
